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I. INTRODUCTION
Is watching Netflix on the broadband Internet more like (A) watch-
ing cable television or (B) talking on the telephone?  Common sense
suggests the answer is “A,” the court that overturned the previous net
neutrality rules1 chose “A,”2 and the First Amendment demands “A.”3
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) nevertheless chose
“B” in its Second Internet Order,4 which declared5 that broadband In-
1. See generally Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, GN Docket No.
09-191, FCC 10-201, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (Dec. 23, 2010) [hereinafter First In-
ternet Order] (adopting the initial net neutrality rules), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 636–42 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
2. See Verizon, 740 F.3d 623.
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand,
Declaratory Ruling and Order, GN Docket No. 14-28, FCC 15-24, 30 FCC Rcd.
5601 (Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Second Internet Order].
5. Id. at para. 331.
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ternet access services are “telecommunications services”6 governed by
the common carrier regulations in Title II of the Communications Act
of 1934.7  It gave no consideration to “A”—whether broadband In-
ternet access is more like a “cable service.”8  The FCC did not consider
the Internet’s mass media capabilities at all.9
If the FCC had expressly acknowledged that the Internet offers
communications capabilities that are functionally equivalent to the
printing press, mail carriage, newspaper publishing, over-the-air
broadcasting, and cable television combined,10 it would have been ob-
vious that classifying broadband Internet service providers (ISPs) as
common carriers is an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of
the press.11  The FCC’s contrary determination that the Internet is
equivalent to plain old telephone service gave traditional media access
theorists and their net-neutrality heirs the victory they could not
achieve at the Supreme Court, which has held that imposing common-
carriage obligations on mass media violates the First Amendment.12
This Article concludes their victory will be short-lived.  Like all
other means of publishing and disseminating mass media communica-
tions, broadband Internet access service is a part of the “press” that
the First Amendment protects from common carriage regulation,13
6. Id. at para. 308; see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2010) (defining “telecommunica-
tions service”).
7. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–21 (1934).  The FCC also concluded that the Internet is func-
tionally equivalent to the public switched telephone network, because telephone
numbers and Internet protocol addresses both “ ‘allow the public to send or re-
ceive messages to or from anywhere in the nation.’” See Second Internet Order,
supra note 4, para. 391 (quoting Implementation of Sections 3(n) & 332 of the
Commc’ns Act, Second Report and Order, GN Docket No. 93-252, FCC 94-31, 9
FCC Rcd. 1411, para. 59 (Mar. 7, 1994) [hereinafter CMRS Forbearance Order]).
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(8) (2010) (defining “cable service”).
9. The Second Internet Order does not contain the term “mass media,” and its First
Amendment analysis does not discuss the difference between mass media and
common carrier communications. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at paras.
544–59.
10. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
11. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353 (2010)
(“There is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment, as originally
understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by media
corporations.”).
12. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (indicating
that compelling a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise print is
unconstitutional).
13. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353–54 (“The Framers may have been una-
ware of certain types of speakers or forms of communication, but that does not
mean that those speakers and media are entitled to less First Amendment protec-
tion than those types of speakers and media that provided the means of commu-
nicating political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.”); see also United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (“We have no doubt that
moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose free-
dom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.”).
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and like all other press, ISPs have a right to exercise editorial discre-
tion over the content they choose to disseminate.14  The FCC’s new net
neutrality rules violate that right under any applicable level of First
Amendment scrutiny by totally banning ISPs from exercising any de-
gree of editorial discretion.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the FCC’s historical ap-
proach to Internet regulation, the theories that drove the classifica-
tion of broadband Internet access as a common carrier service, and the
net neutrality15 rules the FCC adopted in its Second Internet Order.
Part II describes Supreme Court precedent holding that the dissemi-
nation of mass communications is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion, explains the constitutional distinction between common carrier
and mass media communications, and discusses the implications of
denying First Amendment protection to ISPs.  Part III explains why a
reviewing court should apply strict scrutiny to the FCC’s net neutral-
ity rules.  Finally, Part IV argues that the Second Internet Order can-
not withstand either strict or intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment.
II. COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION AND NET NEUTRALITY
The Communications Act defines the subjects of its regulation in
terms of particular communications services—e.g., “information ser-
vice”16 (governed by Title I), “telecommunications service”17 (governed
by Title II18), “mobile service”19 (governed by Title III), and “cable ser-
vice”20 (governed by Title VI21)—not particular communications facili-
ties or their operators.  This distinction is express with respect to the
definition of “telecommunications service,” which applies to the offer-
ing of “telecommunications” for a fee “regardless of the facilities
used.”22  As a result, the same communications facilities can be used
to offer multiple communications services that are subject to different
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. The FCC refers to the rules it adopted in its First and Second Internet Orders as
“Internet openness,” but they are popularly known as “net neutrality” rules. See
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628–29 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (2010).
17. Id. § 153(53).
18. Id. § 153(51) (“[A] telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common car-
rier only to the extent it is engaged in providing telecommunications
services . . . .”).
19. Id. § 153(34).
20. Id. § 153(8).
21. Id. §§ 521–61 (1984).
22. Id. § 153(53).
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regulations.  For example, Verizon uses its fiber-to-the-home facilities
to provide voice, video, and broadband Internet services.23
The FCC’s approach to Internet regulation was initially developed
solely by reference to the common-carrier provisions in Title II that
govern plain old telephone service (POTS)24 because data processing
services once relied on facilities provided by the public switched tele-
phone network.25
A. Regulation of Plain Old Telephone Service
Because POTS was long thought to be a natural monopoly, tele-
phone service was typically a state-sponsored monopoly26 when the
Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act) was adopted.27  Congress
chose to constrain this monopoly through Title II,28 which requires
that common carriers provide communications services at reasonable
rates29 and without unreasonable discrimination.30  In the monopoly
era, the reasonableness of common carrier communications services
was determined through the tariff-filing requirement in Section
20331—the “centerpiece” of the Title II regulatory scheme32—which
mandates that common carriers file their rates with the FCC and
charge only their filed rates.33  Much of Title II and the 1934 Act’s
23. See Wireline Competition Bureau Short Term Network Change Notification Filed
by Verizon New England Inc. d/b/a Verizon Mass., Report Nos. NCD-2365, 2372,
2373, 2014 WL 3547722, at *2 (July 14, 2014).
24. See Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d
483, 487 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d, 262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Common [non-
mobile] residential telephone service is known as ‘POTS’ (‘Plain Old Telephone
Service’).”).
25. See, e.g., In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 455 F.3d 267, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Before
high-speed broadband connections (such as cable modem and digital subscriber
line (DSL) service) became widely available, consumers generally gained access
to the Internet through ‘dial-up’ connections provided by local telephone
companies.”).
26. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) (“Until the
1990’s, local phone service was thought to be a natural monopoly” to which
“States typically granted an exclusive franchise . . . .”).
27. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 235 (1994) (Stevens,
J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun & Souter, JJ.) (“At the time the [1934] Act was
passed, the telephone industry was dominated by the American Telephone & Tel-
egraph Company (AT&T) and its affiliates.”).
28. See id. (noting Title II was “clearly a response” to the market dominance of
AT&T).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1938).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1989).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1990).
32. See MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 220.
33. See Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981).  Under the “filed rate
doctrine,” once a tariff is approved by the governing regulatory agency, it is
deemed reasonable per se, which protects the carrier from liability. See Wego-
land Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1994).
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overall procedural and administrative provisions are premised upon
this tariff-filing requirement.34
When the FCC began permitting competitive entry into telephone
markets in the 1970s,35 it discovered that tariff filing promotes strate-
gic behavior and inhibits innovation in markets that are subject to
competition.36  It found competitive communications carriers had
“channeled considerable efforts toward delaying each other’s attempts
to implement price and service innovation [through strategic objec-
tions to tariff filings] rather than attempting primarily to improve
upon their own performance in the marketplace.”37  The FCC ulti-
mately concluded, “[I]n a competitive market, market forces are gener-
ally sufficient to ensure the lawfulness of rate levels, rate structures,
and terms and conditions of service set by carriers who lack market
power,” and “[R]emoving or reducing regulatory requirements also
tends to encourage market entry [i.e., deployment] and lower costs.”38
34. See MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 230–31 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–28,
401–16).
35. See Microwave Commc’ns, Inc. for Construction Permits to Establish New Facili-
ties in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service at Chi., Ill.,
St. Louis, Mo., and Intermediate Points, Docket No. 19509, FCC 69-870, 18
F.C.C.2d 953 (Aug. 13, 1969).
36. See Sw. Bell Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515, 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  The FCC made
this determination in a series of rulemakings, collectively known as the Competi-
tive Carrier proceedings, in which the FCC gradually deregulated non-dominant
carriers. See generally Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Com-
mon Carrier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Notice of Inquiry and
Proposed Rule Making, CC Docket No. 79-252, FCC 79-599, 77 F.C.C.2d 308
(Sept. 27, 1979) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rule Making]; First Report and
Order, Docket No. 79-525, FCC 80-629, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (Nov. 28, 1980); Further
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, CC Docket No. 79-252, FCC 80-742, 84 F.C.C.2d
445 (Jan. 16, 1981); Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 47 Fed.
Reg. 17308-01 (Apr. 22, 1982); Second Report and Order, CC Docket No. 79-252,
FCC 82-350, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (July 29, 1982); Order and Reconsideration, CC
Docket No. 79-252, FCC 83-69, 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (Mar. 21, 1983); Third Further
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,292-03 (June 21, 1983); Third
Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791-01 (Oct. 14, 1983); Fourth Report and Or-
der, CC Docket No. 79-252, FCC 83-481, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (Oct. 19, 1983), vacated,
AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Fourth Further Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, CC Docket No. 79-252, FCC 84-82, 96 F.C.C.2d 922 (1984); Fifth
Report and Order, CC Docket No. 79-252, FCC 84-394, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (Aug. 8,
1984); Sixth Report and Order, CC Docket No. 79-252, FCC 84-566, 99 F.C.C.2d
1020 (Nov. 21, 1984), rev’d, MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
37. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, supra note 36, at para. 30.
38. See CMRS Forbearance Order, supra note 7, at paras. 173–74.  The FCC deter-
mined that, in a competitive environment, requiring (or merely permitting) tariff
filings can:
(1) take away carriers’ ability to make rapid, efficient responses to
changes in demand and cost, and remove incentives for carriers to intro-
duce new offerings; (2) impede and remove incentives for competitive
price discounting, since all price changes are public, which can therefore
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Because non-dominant carriers are “presumptively unlikely to dis-
criminate unreasonably,”39 the FCC decided to eliminate tariff filing
requirements for wireline common carriers that lack market power.40
In 1993, Congress codified the FCC’s detariffing policy for mobile
telephony service (traditionally known as “CMRS” in FCC parlance).41
As amended, Section 332 authorizes the FCC to forbear from applying
any Title II provision (with the exception of Sections 201, 202, and
208) to CMRS providers if its application is unnecessary to meet the
reasonableness requirements in Sections 201 and 202 or to protect
consumers, and forbearance is otherwise consistent with the public in-
terest.42  In evaluating whether forbearance is consistent with the
public interest, the FCC must consider “whether the proposed regula-
tion . . . will promote competitive market conditions, including the ex-
tent to which such regulation . . . will enhance competition among
providers of commercial mobile service . . . .”43  The FCC forbore from
tariffing CMRS in 2004 based on its findings that: (1) CMRS services
did not operate in a monopoly market, (2) the continued applicability
of Sections 201, 202, and 208 on a case-by-case basis would be suffi-
cient to protect consumers in the event there was a market failure,
and (3) tariffing imposes costs that can themselves be a barrier to
competition.44
That same year, the Supreme Court vacated the FCC’s non-mobile
detariffing policy as inconsistent with the statutory scheme applicable
to POTS45: “For better or worse, the Act establishes a rate-regulation,
filed-tariff system for common-carrier communications, and the Com-
mission’s desire ‘to “increase competition” cannot provide [it] author-
ity to alter the well-established statutory filed rate requirements.’”46
The Court determined only Congress had authority to shift the funda-
mental premise of the Communications Act from scrutinizing the rea-
sonableness of tariff filings to promoting free-market competition.47
be quickly matched by competitors; (3) impose costs on carriers that at-
tempt to make new offerings; (4) simplify tacit collusion as compared to
when rates are individually negotiated; and (5) impose administrative
costs.
Id. at paras. 177–78.
39. Id. at para. 8.
40. See id.
41. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L No. 103–66, 107 Stat. 312,
392 (1993).  Mobile telephony is commonly known as cellular service and is
termed “commercial mobile service” in the Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(d)(1) (1996).
42. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c).
43. Id. § 332(c)(1)(C).
44. See CMRS Forbearance Order, supra note 7, at para. 175.
45. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231–34 (1994).
46. Id. at 234 (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116,
135 (1990)).
47. See id.
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Congress legislated that shift two years later in the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 (1996 Act)48 “[t]o promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services
for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”49  The 1996 Act
adopted Section 1050—a provision “[c]ritical to Congress’s deregula-
tion strategy”51—to require the FCC to forbear from the application of
any Title II provision that meets a forbearance standard that is sub-
stantially the same as the standard in Section 332.52  The broad scope
of Section 10 indicates that Congress envisioned an era in which mar-
ket-based competition completely supplants Title II regulation as the
means of ensuring that telephony services are provided in a manner
that is just and reasonable.
B. Regulation of Data Processing and Dial-Up Internet
Services
The desire to promote competition in the emerging computing mar-
ket drove the FCC’s approach to regulating the dial-up Internet.  In
the 1960s, the Bell System began using mainframe computers to oper-
ate the public switched telephone network.  During network peaks,
the available computing capacity was allocated to network operations,
but during off-peaks, Bell System computers had excess capacity.  The
Bell System wanted to enter the computing services market, in part to
take advantage of its excess off-peak mainframe capacity.  The FCC
initiated a series of rulemakings known collectively as the Computer
Inquiries53 to address concerns that the Bell System could leverage its
48. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
49. See id. at Preamble; see also AT & T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 836 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (citing the Preamble as delineating the 1996 Act’s purpose).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (1996).
51. AT & T Inc., 452 F.3d at 832.
52. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)–(b).
53. See generally Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence
of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities, Final Decision and Or-
der, Docket No. 16979, FCC 71-255, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (Mar. 18, 1971), aff’d in part
sub nom., GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973), Decision on Re-
mand, Order, FCC 73-342, 40 F.C.C.2d 293 (Apr. 3, 1973); Amendment of Section
64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry),
Final Decision, Docket No. 20828, FCC 80-189, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (May 2, 1980)
[hereinafter Computer II], on reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
FCC 80-628, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (Dec. 30, 1980) and Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der on Further Reconsideration, FCC 81-481, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (Oct. 30, 1981),
aff’d sub nom., Computer and Commc’n. Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regula-
tions (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, CC Docket No. 85-229, FCC
86-252, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (June 16, 1986), on reconsideration, Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, FCC 87-102, 2 FCC Rcd. 3035 (May 22,
1987), Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, FCC 88-9, 3 FCC
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state-sponsored monopoly over the public switched telephone network
to dominate the emerging market for computing services.54
1. Forbearance from Regulating Enhanced and Information
Services
In the Computer I55 proceeding, the FCC declined to regulate “pure
data processing services.”56  It recognized, however, that the primary
purpose of some computing services was to offer communications ca-
pabilities that were substitutable for the “pure communications ser-
vices” (i.e., circuit-switched telephony) that had always been subject to
Title II regulation.57  The FCC concluded:
[T]he imposition of regulatory constraints over what is clearly a data process-
ing hybrid offering, even though it contains communications elements which
are an integral part of and an incidental feature thereof, would tend to inhibit
flexibility in the development and dissemination of such valuable offerings
and thus would be contrary to the public interest.58
On the other hand, “[H]ybrid services which are ‘essentially com-
munications’ under the principles enunciated in [the FCC’s] Tentative
Decision, warrant appropriate regulatory treatment as common car-
Rcd. 1135 (Feb. 18, 1988) and Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Re-
consideration and Second Further Reconsideration, FCC 89-226, 4 FCC Rcd.
5927 (Aug. 1, 1989), vacated in part, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990); Report and Order, CC Docket No. 85-229, FCC 87-103, 2 FCC Rcd. 3072
(May 22, 1987), on reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Recon-
sideration, FCC 88-10, 3 FCC Rcd. 1150 (Feb. 18, 1988), vacated in part, Califor-
nia v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Computer III Remand Proceedings,
Report and Order, CC Docket No. 90-368, FCC 90-415, 5 FCC Rcd. 7719 (Dec. 17,
1990), on reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,
FCC 92-14, 7 FCC Rcd. 909 (Jan. 24, 1992); Computer III Remand Proceedings:
Bell Operating Co. Safeguards and Tier I Local Exch. Co. Safeguards, Report and
Order, CC Docket No. 90-623, FCC 91-381, 6 FCC Rcd. 7571 (Dec. 20, 1991), va-
cated in part and remanded, California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994); Com-
puter III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced
Servs.; 1998 Biennial Review—Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and
Requirements, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Report and Order, CC
Docket Nos. 95-20 & 98-10, FCC 98-8, 13 FCC Rcd. 6040 (Jan. 30, 1998), Report
and Order, FCC 99-36, 14 FCC Rcd. 4289 (Mar. 10, 1999), on reconsideration,
Order, FCC 99-387, 14 FCC Rcd. 21628 (Dec. 17, 1999) [collectively, hereinafter
Computer Inquiries].
54. See Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter & Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 16979, FCC
67-239, 7 F.C.C.2d 19, para. 2 (Mar. 1, 1967) (initiating the Computer Inquiries).
55. Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer &
Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, Final Decisions and Order, Docket No. 16979, FCC
71-255, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (Mar. 10, 1971) [hereinafter Computer I].
56. See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, Tentative Decision of the Commission,
Docket No. 16979, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, paras. 41–42 (Apr. 3, 1970).
57. Id.
58. Computer I, supra note 55, at para. 31.
568 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:559
rier services under the Act.”59  The FCC thus determined that hybrid
communications would be subject to Title II, and hybrid data process-
ing would not.60  The distinction depended on the extent to which “the
data processing service was merely incidental to the [traditionally reg-
ulated] message switching.”61
The FCC reversed course in its Computer II proceeding.62  “After
three attempts to delineate a distinction between communications and
data processing services and failing to arrive at any satisfactory de-
marcation point,” the FCC concluded that “further attempts to so dis-
tinguish enhanced services would be ultimately futile, inconsistent
with our statutory mandate and contrary to the public interest.”63
The FCC realized that “over the long run, any attempt to distinguish
enhanced services will not result in regulatory certainty . . . because a
definitional structure is not independent of advances in computer
technology and its concomitant market applications.”64  The FCC also
noted that—because resellers who offered hybrid communications ser-
vices were subject to Title II regulation, but resellers who offered hy-
brid data processing were not—the distinction between hybrid
services in Computer I reduced competition by encouraging resellers
to structure their services in a manner designed to avoid Title II regu-
lation65: “The record in this proceeding makes clear that even when
the Commission’s stated policies are in favor of open entry, the very
presence of Title II requirements inhibits a truly competitive, consumer
responsive market.”66
The FCC concluded that “all enhanced computer services should be
accorded the same regulatory treatment and that no regulatory
scheme could be adopted which would rationally distinguish and clas-
sify enhanced services as either communications or data process-
ing.”67  This conclusion left the FCC with two mutually exclusive
categories of service: (1) “basic” or (2) “enhanced,” and two regulatory
options: (1) “subject all enhanced services to regulation, or (2) refrain
59. Id. at para. 32.
60. Id.
61. Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs.
& Facilities, Report and Order, Docket No. 20097, FCC 76-641, 60 F.C.C.2d 261,
para. 20 (July 1, 1976) [hereinafter Common Carrier Resale Order].
62. Computer II, supra note 53, at para. 107 (citations omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at para. 109.
66. Id. (emphasis added).  A contemporary example of this phenomenon is Google
Fiber, which declined to provide telephone service in order to avoid the applica-
tion of Title II. See Fred Campbell, What Google Fiber Says About Tech Policy:
Fiber Rings Fit Deregulatory Hands, CBIT BLOG (Aug. 7, 2012), http://cbit.org/
blog/2012/08/what-google-fiber-says-about-tech-policy-fiber-rings-fit-deregulato
ry-hands/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9WRF-ELAG.
67. See Computer II, supra note 53, at para. 113.
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from regulating them in toto.”68  The FCC chose the latter option.  It
would regulate only a common carrier offering of “basic transmission
services” under Title II of the Act.69
“In defining the difference between basic and enhanced services,”
the FCC concluded that basic transmission services were “traditional
common carrier communications services and that enhanced services
are not.”70  Like the other definitional categories in the Communica-
tions Act, the FCC based this distinction on the service that was being
offered.71  The FCC saw no need to impose Title II obligations on en-
hanced services, regardless of “whether or not such services employ
communication facilities in order to link the terminals of the subscrib-
ers to centralized computers.”72 Computer II thus created a bright-
line distinction between (1) the traditional offering of the capability to
place telephone calls over the public switched network, which would
continue to be regulated as a common carrier service under Title II;
and (2) all other services, which would remain unregulated.73  A simi-
lar distinction was subsequently adopted by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia as part of the consent decree
(known as the Modified Final Judgment or MFJ74) entered in the anti-
trust proceeding against the Bell System,75 though the MFJ sepa-
rately defined point-to-point communications as “telecommunications”
and referred to basic service as “telecommunications service” and en-
hanced service as “information service.”76
68. Id. at para. 114.
69. See id.
70. See id. at para. 127.
71. See id.
72. See id. at para. 119.
73. See id. at para. 127.
74. See Connect Am. Fund, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, GN Docket No. 09-51, FCC 11-13, 26 FCC Rcd. 4554, para.
47 (Feb. 8, 2011) [hereinafter CAF Notice] (“The 1982 consent decree, as entered
by the court, was called the Modification of Final Judgment because it modified a
1956 Final Judgment against AT&T stemming from a 1949 antitrust lawsuit.”).
75. See generally United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982), aff’d sub nom., Md. v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), modified sub
nom., United States v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated,
84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996) amended sub nom., United States v. W. Elec. Co.,
Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., United
States v. W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
76. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 229.  In its decision adopting the MFJ,
the court distinguished between two different types of information services: (1)
“computer-related” services that involve no control by the carrier over the content
of the information other than for transmission purposes (such as the traditional
data processing services addressed in the Computer Inquiries), and (2) “electronic
publishing” services in which the carrier controls both the transmission of the
information and its content (such as news or entertainment). Id. at 229.  The
court (1) permitted AT&T to provide computer-related services but prohibited it
from providing electronic publishing services, and (2) prohibited the Bell Systems
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The 1996 Act added these terms from the MFJ to the Communica-
tions Act’s definitional section.77  After conducting an in-depth analy-
sis of their meaning in response to a Congressional directive, the FCC
concluded the Act’s new definitions merely built upon the regulatory
dichotomy that had been established previously in Computer II and
the MFJ:
Congress intended the categories of “telecommunications service” and “infor-
mation service” to be mutually exclusive, like the definitions of “basic service”
and “enhanced service” developed in our Computer II proceeding, and the defi-
nitions of “telecommunications” and “information service” developed in the
Modification of Final Judgment that divested the Bell Operating Companies
from AT&T.78
The FCC determined that Congress “intended to maintain a regime in
which information service providers are not subject to regulation as
common carriers merely because they provide their services ‘via
telecommunications.’”79
2. Regulations Subsidizing the Dial-Up Internet
The market for dial-up Internet access resulted from a combination
of the FCC’s common carrier resale policies and its decision to exempt
enhanced and information services from paying access charges.
a. Common Carrier Resale
The FCC regulated common carriers as offering fully integrated
services directly to end users until it began promoting competition in
the 1970s, when it forced common carriers offering telephony services
to “unbundle” their integrated service offerings.80  In the Common
Carrier Resale Order, the FCC concluded that tariffs of monopoly
wireline common carriers that restricted or prohibited resale of com-
munications services and facilities were unjust and unreasonable
under Sections 201 and 202 of the Act.81  The FCC recognized that
requiring common carriers to offer unbundled access to their facilities
“would be a departure from the tradition in the communications in-
dustry where carriers owning and operating transmission facilities
generally supply a complete communications service directly to the ul-
local operating companies (or BOCs) from providing either form of information
service. Id. at 178–90.
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), (50), (53) (2010).
78. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, CC Docket No. 96-
45, FCC 98-279, 13 FCC Rcd. 21312, para. 13 (Oct. 22, 1998).
79. Id.
80. See Common Carrier Resale Order, supra note 61.
81. See id. at paras. 6, 13.  In effect, the FCC required monopoly common carriers
offering public switched telephone service to offer their underlying communica-
tions facilities for lease so that other entities could use them to self-provision or to
provide their own service offerings directly to end users in competition with the
monopolists.
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timate user.”82  It concluded the departure was justified at that time
to enable entities who did not own transmission facilities to aid in
meeting an “untapped, growing need for non-voice communications.”83
The government-mandated leasing of common carrier lines at regu-
lated rates had the effect of providing dial-up ISPs with the use of
local business lines at artificially low prices that were subsidized by
plain old telephone services.84
b. Access Charge Exemptions
For nearly seventy years, the government enabled affordable, local
telephone service (a concept known as “universal service”), including
in rural areas that would otherwise be uneconomic to serve, by main-
taining the monopoly status of the Bell System and other (primarily
rural) telephone companies and manipulating their rates to subsidize
the costs of operating local telephone networks.85  In very simplified
terms,86 this is how the subsidy worked: The FCC permitted AT&T to
charge above-market rates for long distance services (e.g., phone calls
that crossed state lines).87  AT&T then privately agreed to pay a por-
tion of its resulting excess profits (more than $10 billion per year in
the early 1980s88) to the Bell System and independent local telephone
companies to enable them to charge below-market prices for local tele-
phone service.89  As a result of this “settlements” system,90 subscrib-
ers who paid higher rates for long distance calls (primarily businesses
in that era) subsidized approximately 80% of the cost of local tele-
phone infrastructure.91
This settlements system ended in the early 1980s after the MFJ
forced AT&T to divest its local operating companies in order to pro-
82. See id. at para. 10.
83. See id. at para. 81.  The Common Carrier Resale Order excluded MTS and WATS
services, but the FCC extended the resale obligation to all public switched net-
work services in 1980. See Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared
Use of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switched Network Servs., Report and
Order, CC Docket No. 80-54, FCC 80-607, 83 F.C.C.2d 167, para. 1 (Oct. 21,
1980).
84. See infra subsection II.B.2.b (describing how the FCC’s universal service policies
subsidized the cost of local telephone infrastructure).
85. See CAF Notice, supra note 74, at para. 46.
86. Regulators also required local telephone companies to subsidize rural subscribers
by requiring them to charge rural and urban subscribers the same rates, even
though the cost of providing service in rural areas was higher (a concept known
as “rate averaging”). See id.
87. See id.
88. MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, Third Report and Order, CC Docket No. 78-72,
FCC 82-579, 93 F.C.C.2d 241, paras. 11, 14 (Dec. 22, 1982) [hereinafter MTS Mkt.
Structure].
89. CAF Notice, supra note 74, at para. 46.
90. See id. at para. 46 n.29.
91. Id. at para. 46; see MTS Mkt. Structure, supra note 88, at para. 11.
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mote competition in the long distance market.92  The system of subsi-
dizing local telephone networks through excess profits generated by
AT&T’s monopoly on long distance services was no longer viable once
competitors entered the long-distance market.93  The FCC replaced
settlements with a system of tariffed intercarrier compensation that,
among other things, requires long distance carriers to pay explicit “ac-
cess charges” at tariffed rates to local telephone companies for the
origination and termination of long distance calls.94
The FCC exempted enhanced service providers (ESPs) who termi-
nated long distance traffic from paying access charges in order to
avoid a “rate shock” to data users who had been paying lower “local
business exchange service” rates for long distance.95  This “ESP ex-
emption” was initially intended to be temporary, because it “forced
[telephone subscribers] to bear a disproportionate share of the local
[telephone network] costs that access charges are designed to cover.”96
The FCC subsequently extended the ESP exemption indefinitely, de-
spite its discriminatory impact on telephone subscribers who did not
use data services, because the enhanced services industry was “in a
uniquely complex period of transition.”97  The FCC concluded that,
“[T]o the extent the exemption for enhanced service providers may be
discriminatory, it remains, for the present, not an unreasonable
discrimination.”98
After the 1996 Act was passed, the FCC exempted dial-up ISPs
from paying access charges for terminating long distance Internet
traffic.99  The FCC deemed dial-up ISPs to be local “end user” tele-
phone customers for regulatory purposes and permitted them to lease
lines from telephone companies at the significantly lower, flat
monthly rates applicable to business telephone lines used for local
92. See CAF Notice, supra note 74, at para. 47.
93. See MTS Mkt. Structure, supra note 88, at para. 11 (“The MFJ requires the termi-
nation of this [settlement] system and its replacement by a generalized tariffed
offering of access service.”).
94. See CAF Notice, supra note 74, at paras. 47–54, 496–501.  In 2011, the FCC de-
cided to transition to a “bill and keep” regime that will eliminate terminating
access charges over time, primarily to correct market distortions created by the
rate averaging requirement imposed on interexchange carriers. See Connect Am.
Fund, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WC Docket
No. 05-337, FCC 11-161, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, paras. 741, 745 (Nov. 18, 2011)
[hereinafter CAF Notice II].
95. See MTS and WATS Mkt. Structure, Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC
Docket No. 78-72, FCC 83-356, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, para. 83 (Aug. 22, 1983).
96. See Amendments of Part 69 of the Commn’s Rules Relating to Enhanced Serv.
Providers, Order, CC Docket No. 87-215, FCC 88-151, 3 FCC Rcd. 2631, para. 2
(Apr. 27, 1988).
97. See id. at para. 13.
98. See id. at para. 19.
99. See Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, CC Docket No. 95-72, FCC
97-158, 12 FCC Rcd. 15982, 16003, para. 50 (May 16, 1997).
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calls.100  Because dial-up ISPs could pay a flat monthly rate for the
local termination of interstate data traffic rather than the per-minute
charges that were then applicable to long distance telephone calls,
ISPs offered unlimited dial-up Internet access to consumers at flat
monthly rates that were artificially low in comparison to the rates
charged for usage-sensitive long distance calls.101  As a result, con-
sumers who subscribed to plain old telephone services—including con-
sumers who did not use online services—were forced to subsidize the
costs of dial-up Internet access.102
C. Pre-Common Carrier Regulation of Broadband Services
The impetus for net neutrality began when the commercial In-
ternet began to shift from dial-up access, which relied on the public
switched network to establish an Internet connection,103 to broadband
communications, which originate in Internet protocol and bypass en-
tirely the circuit switches used for plain old telephone service.104  As
early as 1997, the FCC recognized that, though virtually all residen-
tial users then connected to the Internet through telephone facilities
designed for circuit-switched voice calls,105 it would need to modify its
regulatory approach to “facilitate the development of the high-
bandwidth data networks of the future.”106  The FCC was concerned
that its Title II rules “may hinder the development of emerging
100. See id. at para. 342.
101. See id.
102. See id. at paras. 344–48.  The FCC acknowledged that Internet traffic was caus-
ing network congestion, but decided to address the issue through means other
than access charges. See id. at paras. 347–48.
103. See, e.g., FRED B. CAMPBELL, BROADBAND TRANSMISSIONS ARE NOT “TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS” 18 (Feb. 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/R5QH-NANH (“To
establish an Internet connection, dial-up users make an ordinary, analog tele-
phone call by dialing a 7-digit local telephone number (NXX-XXXX) that is as-
signed to a ‘toll free’ business line that is connected to the ISP’s server . . . . A dial-
up connection to the Internet is only established after the telephone call is con-
nected to the ISP’s server . . . .”); see also, e.g., Access Charge Reform Price Cap
Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, Third Report and Order, Notice of Inquiry, CC Docket No. 96-262, FCC 96-
488, 11 FCC Rcd. 21354, para. 313 (Dec. 24, 1996) [hereinafter Access Charge
Price Cap] (“Many of the concerns now being raised about switch congestion
caused by Internet usage arise because virtually all residential users today con-
nect to the Internet—a packet-switched data network—through incumbent LEC
switching facilities designed for circuit-switched voice calls.”).
104. See CAMPBELL, supra note 103, at 24 (citing Vonage Holdings Corp. Petition for
Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket No. 03-211, FCC 04-267, 19 FCC Rcd.
22404, paras. 4–9 (2004)).
105. See Access Charge Price Cap, supra note 103, at para. 313.
106. See id. at para. 311.  The FCC noted, “The end-to-end dedicated channels created
by circuit switches are unnecessary and even inefficient when used to connect an
end user to an ISP.” Id. at para. 313.
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packet-switched data networks” and initiated a new proceeding to con-
sider whether it should use its forbearance or preemption authority to
avoid hampering the deployment of new technologies.107  Changes to
the existing regime threatened to put an end to the system of regula-
tory subsidies on which most dial-up ISPs based their business plans.
1. Competition Begets Net Neutrality Theory
The issue quickly gained momentum when cable operators entered
the market for broadband services.108  Cable operators, who had never
been considered common carriers under Title II and were not bound
by the MFJ or the FCC regulatory regime that had subsidized the bus-
iness model of over-the-top ISPs during the dial-up era, entered into
exclusive arrangements with Excite@Home to provide Internet access
to their subscribers.109  This presented a threat to the business model
of dial-up ISPs, such as America Online, who relied on FCC regulation
to provide slower dial-up service.110  Dial-up ISPs claimed these exclu-
sive arrangements threatened the openness of the Internet.  They ar-
gued that the FCC should (1) prohibit cable operators from entering
into exclusive broadband arrangements, and (2) extend the common
carrier resale policy to cable networks (i.e., mandate that cable opera-
tors provide “open access” by unbundling their networks).111  Incum-
bent ISPs ignored the irony in asking the FCC to replicate the
advantages they derived from the dial-up regulatory scheme—which
was designed to address a monopoly—to counter a business threat
posed by emerging competition in the Internet access market.
Though dial-up ISPs initiated the “open access” debate, it ex-
panded to become a new front for the proponents of media access the-
ory,112 which posits that the private press is a greater threat to
107. See id. at paras. 311–13.
108. See, e.g., Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Sec-
tion 214 Authorizations from Tele-Commc’ns, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp.,
Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, CS Docket No. 98-178, 14 FCC
Rcd. 3160, para. 9 (Feb. 18, 1999) (noting AT&T’s announcement that it would
upgrade its cable networks to serve almost one-third of American households
with broadband).
109. See Steven A. Augustino, The Cable Open Access Debate: The Case for a Whole-
sale Market, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 653, 653–54 (2000).
110. See id. at 654.
111. See id.
112. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 972 (2005) (listing Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Media Access Project, as coun-
sel for the Center for Digital Democracy, who opposed the FCC’s decision to clas-
sify cable broadband as a non-common carrier service); Hannibal Travis, The
FCC’s New Theory of the First Amendment, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 417, 418
(2011) (attempting “to theorize mass media and Internet regulation as a solution
to the problem of discriminatory, biased, and deceptive coverage of the nation’s
most important political debates”).
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freedom of expression than the government.113  By 2000, some had
begun to argue that “broadband is simply a transmission media,
rather than an end user Internet service, as the ‘open access’ debate
typically characterizes it.”114  They shifted the argument from the
horizontal competition concerns of dial-up ISPs to vertical concerns
about the ability of content owners to access the “transmission capac-
ity” of cable networks at wholesale rates.115  Though it is rooted in
media access theory,116 the notion that broadband ISPs should be reg-
ulated as common carriers was given a catchy new name—“net neu-
trality”117—and described in positive terms calculated to appeal to
ordinary consumers.118  This clever rebranding119 played a critical
role in turning a failed media access strategy that had previously been
focused on explicitly reversing First Amendment precedent in the
courts into a debate about common carriage that would be decided by
113. See JOHN B. THOMPSON, MEDIA AND MODERNITY: A SOCIAL THEORY OF THE MEDIA,
Ch. 8: Publicness Beyond the State (Stanford Univ. Press 1995).
114. See Augustino, supra note 109, at 654.
115. See id. at 654, 671.
116. Media access theory assumes that private media corporations are a bigger threat
to free expression than the government, and its proponents believe the govern-
ment should protect free expression from the private media. See AT&T Inc. &
Bellsouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, WC 06-74, FCC 06-189, 22 FCC Rcd. 5662, 5831 (Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Bellsouth Application for Transfer] (Copps, Comm’r, concurring) (stating that
corporations are a greater threat to the Internet than the government); Miami
Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247–48 (1974) (“[S]upporting advo-
cates of an enforceable right of access to the press vigorously argue that govern-
ment has an obligation to ensure that a wide variety of views reach the public.”).
117. Professor Timothy Wu is often credited with coining the term. See, e.g., Sheraz
Syed, Prioritizing Traffic: The Internet Fast Lane, 25 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. L. 151, 154 (2014) (“Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School
popularized this principle in 2003.” (citing Timothy Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003))); see
also Keith Wagstaff, Net Neutrality: How Open-Internet Activists Won Big, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/net-neutrality-how-
open-internet-activists-won-big-n313406, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7JJT-
PQ89 (“The term ‘net neutrality’ was coined back in 2003 by Columbia law profes-
sor Tim Wu.”).
118. See, e.g., Fred Campbell, Why Conservatives Must Heed Congressman Issa’s Call,
THE ATLANTIC (July 26, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2012/07/why-conservatives-must-heed-congressman-issas-call/260374/, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/UD5P-9UQP (noting that the new narrative “uses the
language of conservatism (they ‘preserve’ the open Internet), the language of lib-
erty (they defend Internet ‘freedom’), the language of markets (they promote
‘competition’), and the language of modernization (they encourage ‘innovation’) in
vague, sweeping principles”).
119. But see Nancy Scola, Five Myths About Net Neutrality, WASH. POST (June 12,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-net-neutral-
ity/2014/06/12/ff58ad7c-ec06-11e3-93d2-edd4be1f5d9e_story.html, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/S6D6-DEHU (arguing net neutrality was “poorly branded”).
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the FCC120—an agency with its own jurisdictional interests at
stake.121
2. Initial Broadband Classification Decisions
The FCC handed media access and future net neutrality advocates
an early victory in 1998, when it decided to regulate xDSL as a tele-
communications service based on a cursory analysis.122  With respect
to the key question—whether xDSL service uses “telecommunica-
tions”123—the FCC merely repeated the statutory definition: “To the
extent that an advanced service does no more than transport informa-
tion of the user’s choosing between or among user-specified points,
without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received, it is ‘telecommunications,’ as defined by the Act.”124  The
FCC made no attempt to quantify the “extent” to which advanced ser-
vices “do no more than” that or to apply individually the elements of
the statutory definition of “telecommunications” to xDSL.  It instead
relied on its pre-1996 Act decisions in the Computer Inquiries and re-
lated proceedings, which required the monopoly Bell System’s local
operating companies to unbundle their telephone network facilities
and offer them on a non-discriminatory basis to competing ISPs, as if
there was no difference between plain old telephone service and the
multimedia capabilities offered by broadband service.125  The FCC did
not address the First Amendment implications of its decision to treat
xDSL services as common carrier communications, and its decision
was never reviewed on appeal.126
120. Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 939–40 (2012)
(“The debate is not one of common carriage versus unfettered discretion.  Rather,
it is a disagreement over what content can be blocked and over who makes that
determination.”).
121. The FCC has acknowledged that the POTS network is being replaced by the In-
ternet. See Tech. Transitions, Order, Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, WC Docket Nos. 10-90, 12-97, FCC 14-5, 29 FCC Rcd.
1433, 1435 (Jan. 31, 2014).  The FCC’s decision to reclassify broadband Internet
access service as a telecommunications service ensures the FCC will continue to
have Title II authority after the POTS network is shut down.
122. See Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Docket No. 98-147, FCC 98-188, 13 FCC
Rcd. 24012, para. 35 (Aug. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Deployment of Wireline].
123. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50) (2010); Fred Campbell, CBIT White Paper: Broadband Trans-
missions Are Not “Telecommunications,” CTR. FOR BOUNDLESS INNOVATION IN
TECH. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://cbit.org/blog/2015/02/cbit-white-paper-broadband-
transmissions-are-not-telecommunications/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
LR8N-6FE9.
124. See Deployment of Wireline, supra note 122, at para. 35.
125. See id. at para. 37.
126. In an unpublished decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case
without addressing the merits in order to allow the FCC to reconsider its decision
based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.
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In response to the subsequent open access debate, however, the
FCC concluded that broadband Internet access offered by cable opera-
tors was an “information service” that could not be regulated as a com-
mon carrier service.127  The FCC’s statutory analysis of cable
broadband service impliedly admitted that its previous decision to un-
bundle xDSL was premised primarily on its monopoly-era common
carrier resale requirement rather than an analysis of the 1996 Act’s
new statutory terms: The FCC noted that the “relevant definitions” in
the 1996 Act focus “on the single, integrated information service” that
a broadband subscriber receives,128 and on that basis, declined to ex-
tend the Computer II unbundling requirements to cable networks.129
The FCC subsequently reclassified wireline broadband access (xDSL
and fiber) as a telecommunications service,130 and classified broad-
band over power line131 and wireless broadband services as telecom-
munications services.132  It did not address the First Amendment in
these classification decisions.
3. Adjudicatory Net Neutrality Decisions
The campaign to classify broadband as a common carrier service
intensified after the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s classification
of cable broadband as an information service.133  In 2005, former FCC
Commissioner Michael Copps demanded the adoption of an Internet
See US W. Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1410, 1999 WL 728555 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
25, 1999).  In its order on remand, the FCC did not address its previous analysis
regarding the classification of xDSL and the analysis was not considered in the
appeal of the FCC’s order on remand. See Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offer-
ing Advanced Telecomms. Capability, First Report and Order and Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 98-147, FCC 99-48, 14 FCC Rcd. 4761
(Mar. 31, 1999), vacated, GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
127. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable & Other Facilities,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, GN Docket No. 00-185,
FCC 02-77, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, para. 7 (2002) [hereinafter Inquiry Concerning
High-Speed Access], aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
128. See id. at para. 41.
129. See id. at para. 43.
130. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No.
02-33, FCC 05-150, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 14855, para. 1 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Wireline Broadband Order].
131. See United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the
Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Serv. as an Info.
Serv., Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket No. 06-10, FCC 06-165, 21
FCC Rcd. 13281 (Nov. 7, 2006).
132. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, WT Docket No. 07-53, FCC 07-30 (Mar.
23, 2007).
133. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1002
(2005).
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Policy Statement134 announcing neutrality principles as a condition
for his concurring vote in a merger proceeding.135  His concurring
statement in a 2007 merger proceeding removed any doubt that net
neutrality had become a brand name for the application of media ac-
cess theory to the Internet:
[I]n an age when the Internet is increasingly controlled by a handful of mas-
sive private network operators, the source of centralized authority that
threatens the Internet has dramatically shifted.  The tiny group of corpora-
tions that control access to the Internet [not the government] is the greatest
threat to Internet freedom in our country today.136
A year later the FCC embraced this theory in the Comcast Or-
der.137  The FCC declared that Comcast Corporation had violated the
Internet Policy Statement by routing some Internet connections based
on their contents rather than their destinations and ordered it to
change its Internet routing practices.138  But the D.C. Circuit vacated
the order because the FCC had relied on its ancillary authority139 to
134. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, CC Docket No. 01-337, FCC 05-151, 20 FCC Rcd.
14986 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy Statement].
135. See SBC Commc’ns Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of
Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket No. 05-65, FCC 05-183, 20
FCC Rcd. 18290 (Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter SBC and AT&T Applications]
(Copps, Comm’r, concurring).  He continued to insist that the FCC impose net
neutrality conditions in subsequent merger proceedings. See, e.g., Bellsouth Ap-
plication for Transfer, supra note 116, at 5836 (“One hallmark of this Order is
that it applies explicit, enforceable provisions to preserve and protect the open
and interconnected nature of the Internet, including not only a commitment to
abide by the four principles of the FCC Internet Policy Statement but also an
historic agreement to ensure that the combined company will maintain a neutral
network and neutral routing in its wireline broadband Internet access service.”).
136. Bellsouth Application for Transfer, supra note 116, at 5831 (emphasis added).
137. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp.
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, WC Docket No. 07-52, FCC 08-183, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, paras. 41, 54 (Aug.
20, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Order], vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d
642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
138. See id.  Though the FCC’s analysis mirrored certain aspects of the First Amend-
ment’s strict scrutiny standard, the FCC applied the narrow tailoring test to a
private entity (Comcast), not the agency’s own action. See id. at para. 48 (asking
whether Comcast’s practices were “carefully tailored to its interest in easing net-
work congestion”).  The FCC expressly mentioned the First Amendment only
once in the Order’s text and solely in relation to the agency’s statutory authority.
See id. at para. 21.  The FCC dismissed First Amendment issues in a footnote.
See id. at para. 43 n.203; see also Travis, supra note 112 (construing footnote 203
in the Comcast Order as “a stunning victory to advocates of media reform”).
139. For a discussion of the FCC’s ancillary authority, see Christopher S. Yoo, Wick-
ard for the Internet? Network Neutrality After Verizon v. FCC, 66 FED. COMM. L.J.
415, 433–35 (2014).
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enforce mere policy statements rather than a statutorily mandated
responsibility.140
4. First Internet Order
In its First Internet Order, the FCC responded to the court’s deci-
sion by adopting net neutrality rules.141  The FCC again had relied on
its ancillary authority to regulate ISPs, but this time it determined its
authority was supported by a statutory obligation in Section 706 of the
1996 Act to accelerate broadband deployment.142  The FCC concluded
that (1) creating additional demand for broadband services through
the “virtuous circle of innovation” promotes broadband deployment,143
(2) the virtuous circle is the best way to create additional demand for
broadband access services,144 and (3) to protect the virtuous circle, the
FCC must prohibit ISPs from controlling the content, applications,
and services transmitted on their networks and the devices attached
to their networks.145
The FCC’s virtuous circle theory is predicated on the benefits of
creating additional demand for broadband Internet access services.146
According to this theory, Internet openness creates additional demand
for Internet access services by enabling “new uses of the network—
including new content, applications, services, and devices—[which]
lead to increased end-user demand for broadband, which drives net-
works improvements, which in turn lead to further innovative net-
work uses.”147
The FCC identified the threat to the virtuous circle as the ability of
broadband providers to exercise “gatekeeper control” over access to
their subscribers.148  The gatekeeper theory posits that, in the ab-
sence of net neutrality regulation, any ISP could “force edge providers
to pay inefficiently high fees because that [ISP] is typically an edge
provider’s only option for reaching a particular end user.”149  These
fees would reduce innovation at the edge, which would reduce con-
sumer demand for broadband Internet access and, in turn, the likely
rate of improvements to network infrastructure.150  Put more simply,
140. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Am. Li-
brary Ass’n. v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).  The court did not men-
tion the First Amendment. See id.
141. First Internet Order, supra note 1.
142. See 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2008).
143. First Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 14.
144. See id. at paras. 28, 38–42.
145. See id. at para. 43.
146. See id. at para. 14.
147. Id.
148. See id. at para. 15.
149. Id. at para. 24.
150. See id. at para. 14.
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the theory presumes that, “[W]hen a broadband provider acts as a
gatekeeper, it actually chokes consumer demand for the very broad-
band product it can supply.”151
In contrast to the competition-based theories that underlie commu-
nications regulation in the 1934 (regulating natural monopoly) and
1996 Acts (promoting competition), the FCC’s gatekeeper theory
“do[es] not depend upon broadband providers having market power
with respect to end users,”152 because:
• The costs of switching from one ISP to another are too high for
competition to prevent ISPs from setting “inefficiently high fees”
for edge providers;153 and
• Even when end users already have access to multiple ISPs with-
out incurring switching costs, “the end user, not the edge pro-
vider, chooses which broadband provider the edge provider must
rely on to reach the end user” at any particular time.154
Because the FCC’s theory conclusively presumes an ISP presents a
threat of gatekeeper control whenever an end user chooses to use that
ISP as their means of accessing the Internet at any given point in
time—i.e., that broadband deployment would be harmed unless “the
market for [edge provider] offerings include[s] all U.S. end users” at
all times155—the FCC determined there was no need to conduct a
market power analysis before imposing net neutrality rules on
ISPs.156
The FCC adopted three net neutrality rules to ensure that edge
providers could always reach all end users on ISPs networks:
1. Transparency.  Fixed and mobile ISPs must disclose the net-
work management practices, performance characteristics, and
terms and conditions of their broadband services;157
2. No blocking.  Fixed ISPs may not block lawful content, applica-
tions, services, or non-harmful devices; and mobile ISPs may
151. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 20.
152. First Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 32.
153. See id. at paras. 27, 34.
154. See id. at para. 24 n.65.
155. Id. at para. 30.
156. See id. at para. 32 n.87.
157. These disclosures are substantially the same as those required by the tariff filing
requirement applicable to common carriers, except that the FCC is not required
to act on ISP disclosures in a particular timeframe and the transparency require-
ment does not have the effect of exempting ISPs from liability. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 203 (1990); see also Fred Campbell, FCC’s First Net Neutrality Fine Heralds the
Big Internet Chill, FORBES (Jul. 29, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
fredcampbell/2015/07/29/fccs-first-net-neutrality-fine-heralds-the-big-internet-
chill/ (explaining that the differences between Title II’s tariff filing requirement
and the FCC’s net neutrality rules are primarily procedural).
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not block lawful websites, or block applications that compete
with their voice or video telephony services;158 and
3. No unreasonable discrimination.  Fixed broadband providers
only may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful
network traffic.159
The FCC also provided an exemption to the rules against blocking and
unreasonable discrimination for “reasonable network management”
and determined that the rules did not prevent ISPs from offering “spe-
cialized services” that use Internet Protocol.160
The rules applied only to “broadband Internet access service,”
which was defined as a “mass-market retail service by wire or radio
that provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data from
all or substantially all Internet endpoints . . . but exclud[ed] dial-up
Internet access service.”161  The FCC excluded other services that act
as gatekeepers between edge providers and end users.162  It deter-
mined ISPs are “distinguishable from other participants in the In-
ternet marketplace”163 because ISPs are “capable of blocking,
degrading, or favoring any Internet traffic that flows to or from a par-
ticular subscriber,”164 but did not expressly consider whether other
service providers have the same capabilities.165
On review, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trans-
parency rule, but struck down the blocking and non-discrimination
rules.166  The court held that the FCC’s virtuous circle theory was a
reasonable interpretation of its statutory obligation to accelerate
broadband deployment and its prediction that protecting the virtual
circle would actually accelerate deployment was rational and sup-
ported by substantial evidence.167  The court nevertheless vacated the
blocking and unreasonable discrimination rules because those rules
constituted common carriage regulations, and the Communications
Act prohibits the FCC from imposing common carriage regulations on
information services.168
158. The FCC permitted mobile ISPs to discriminate against and block certain content
because the mobile broadband market was rapidly evolving and more competitive
than the fixed market. See First Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 49.
159. See id. at para. 1.
160. Id. at para. 39.
161. Id. at para. 44.
162. Id. at para. 50.
163. Id. at para. 50 n.160.
164. Id. at para. 50.
165. See id.
166. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
167. See id. at 643–44.
168. See id. at 650, 655, 657–59.
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D. Reclassification of Broadband as a Common Carrier
Service
In its Second Internet Order, the FCC declared that broadband In-
ternet access service is a telecommunications service subject to com-
mon carriage regulation under Title II of the Communications Act and
adopted expanded net neutrality rules.169  The FCC concluded that
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization of Internet traffic “invaria-
bly harm the open Internet” and imposed a “bright-line” ban on each
of them170:
1. No-blocking.  The no-blocking rule is substantially similar to the
blocking ban adopted in the First Internet Order except that is
applies equally to fixed and mobile ISPs.171
2. No throttling.  The no-throttling rule bans “conduct that is not
outright blocking, but inhibits the delivery of particular content,
applications, or services, or particular classes of content, appli-
cations, or services,” or “impairs or degrades lawful traffic to a
non-harmful device or class of devices.”172
3. No paid prioritization.  The no-paid prioritization rule (also
known as “fast lanes”) bans ISPs from accepting payment (mon-
etary or otherwise) to manage their networks “in a way that
benefits particular content, applications, services, or de-
vices.”173  This rule is similar to the rule prohibiting unreasona-
ble discrimination in the First Internet Order with a notable
exception—it presumes all discrimination within particular
classes of applications, content, and services is unreasonable,174
but provides ISPs an opportunity to rebut that presumption
through a waiver process.175
All three bans apply equally to both fixed and mobile ISPs.176
In addition to these bright-line bans, the FCC imposed a “catch-all”
rule prohibiting ISPs from unreasonably interfering with or unreason-
ably disadvantaging (1) end users’ ability to select, access, and use
broadband Internet access service or the lawful Internet content, ap-
plications, services, or devices of their choice; or (2) edge providers’
ability to make lawful content, applications, services, or devices avail-
169. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4.
170. See id. at para. 14.
171. See id. at para. 15.
172. Id. at para. 120.
173. Id. at para. 18.
174. The “no-blocking and no-throttling rules apply to particular classes of applica-
tions, content and services as well as particular applications, content, and ser-
vices.” Id. at para. 17 n.17.  However, the no-paid prioritization ban apparently
does not. See id. at para. 125.
175. See id. at para. 129.
176. See id. at para. 14.
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able to end users.177  The FCC determined this standard was neces-
sary because “[g]atekeeper power can be exercised through a variety of
technical and economic means”178 that might not otherwise be cap-
tured by its bright-line bans.179
The FCC reaffirmed its previous conclusion that an exception for
reasonable network management “is necessary for broadband provid-
ers to optimize overall network performance and maintain a consis-
tent quality experience for consumers while carrying a variety of
traffic over their networks.”180  But the FCC strictly limited the excep-
tion to practices that have technical justifications.  “For a practice to
even be considered under this exception, a broadband Internet access
service provider must first show that the practice is primarily moti-
vated by a technical network management justification rather than
other business [or content-related] justifications.”181  The FCC did not
apply the reasonable network management exception to the no-paid
prioritization rule “because paid prioritization is inherently a business
[or content related] practice rather than a network management prac-
tice.”182  The FCC’s new neutrality rules thus constitute a total ban on
the exercise of editorial discretion by ISPs.
III. DISSEMINATION OF MASS MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS
It is a fundamental principle of the First Amendment that the op-
erators of mass media communications systems have a right to exer-
cise editorial discretion.  Well over a century ago the Supreme Court
held that the government’s decision to act as a conduit for the dissemi-
nation of mass media communications by carrying newspapers in the
mail “necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be ex-
cluded” from carriage.183  The Court has since applied this same prin-
ciple to each mass media communications system it has considered.184
Based on its existing precedent, there is no reason to doubt the Court
will similarly hold that ISPs have the same right to discriminate
177. See id. at para. 21.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Id. at para. 215.
181. Id. at para. 216 (emphasis added).  The FCC also increased its disclosure require-
ments, and concluded that the exchange of traffic between a broadband Internet
access provider and connecting networks (known as “interconnection”) is a tele-
communications service subject to Title II regulation. Id. at paras. 24, 29.  The
FCC did not apply its bright-line net neutrality rules to interconnection, however,
due to its lack of experience with business practices in the market for intercon-
nection. Id. at paras. 30–31.
182. Id. at para. 18 n.18.
183. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877).
184. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123–25
(1973); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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against the speech of others through the exercise of editorial
discretion.
There is no question that the Internet is a means of disseminating
mass media communications.185  It simultaneously offers functional-
ity that is substitutable for the delivery of newspapers through the
mail, over-the-air broadcast of radio and television programming, the
transmission of cable video programming, and the distribution of
books.  The Internet is replacing broadcast and cable services as
means to disseminate music, video, and talk radio programming—a
development that has prompted the FCC to consider whether online
video distribution should be regulated like a multichannel video pro-
gramming distribution (MVPD) service (e.g., satellite television)186—
and it has already eclipsed the traditional role of the postal service in
the dissemination of newspapers to the reading public.187  Though
they have been available on a widespread basis for less than a decade,
electronic books distributed primarily via the Internet now account for
about thirty percent of all book sales.188
The ongoing shift of text from paper to digital media has seismic
implications for the freedom of the press.  The convergence of elec-
tronic publishing and distribution on the Internet has blurred the
traditional boundaries between textual media and the government-
regulated communications businesses that once distributed only audio
and visual media.189  “The declining dominance of print media is a
cause for concern, for they are the media that in the United States and
elsewhere in the free world enjoy autonomy from government.  It mat-
ters that people are increasingly getting their news and ideas through
governmentally controlled media.”190  The Internet has slowly been
breaking down the “dikes that in the past held government back from
exerting control on the print media . . . .”191  The FCC’s decision to
185. See, e.g., Barbara Esbin, Internet over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the
Past, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 37, 42 (Winter 1999) (“The Internet is . . . a world-
wide broadcasting capability . . . .”).
186. See Promoting Innovation and Competition in the Provision of Multichannel
Video Programming Dist. Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MB Docket No.
14-261, FCC Rcd. 15995 (Dec. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Promoting Innovation].
187. According to the Newspaper Association of America, more Americans are now
reading newspapers online than in print. See The Evolution of Newspaper Inno-
vation, NEWSPAPER ASS’N OF AM. (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.naa.org/innovation,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Q6HU-EDR4.
188. See George Packer, Cheap Words, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/17/cheap-words, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/HUN8-QRZK.
189. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 24–28 (Belknap Press,
Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1983) (discussing convergence in the pre-Internet era
and noting that “[a]ll media are becoming electronic”).
190. Id. at 22.
191. Id. at 24; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 352
(2010) (“With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast
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regulate ISPs as common carriers threatens to blow the dikes wide
open.
These concerns about the loss of First Amendment protections
raised by the shift from print to digital media are exacerbated by the
conduciveness of the Internet to disguising governmental censorship
and its susceptibility to censorship by proxy or soft censorship.192
Governmental interference with the dissemination of speech over the
Internet can occur via manipulation of the distribution architecture
without the knowledge of an end user, who might be unable to discern
that government censorship has occurred.193  The exercise of exten-
sive regulatory jurisdiction over the Internet also enhances the gov-
ernment’s ability to pressure ISPs and other third-party
intermediaries to accede to government demands for censorship by
proxy in order to protect themselves from regulatory sanctions or over-
reach.194  Though the dangers of censorship by proxy were widely rec-
ognized after the excesses of the McCarthy era, proxy censorship of
the Internet in the United States has been growing with little fan-
fare.195  The FCC’s assertion of comprehensive jurisdiction to impose
costly economic regulations on ISPs and other Internet companies
combined with its conclusion that ISPs have no right to First Amend-
ment protection threatens to worsen this problem.196
A. Application of the Press Clause to Dissemination
To the extent ISPs disseminate mass media communications, there
should be no doubt they are speakers who are entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.  The FCC’s contention that ISPs do not deserve pro-
tection because they are mere “conduits for the speech of others”197 is
both factually and legally erroneous.
It is a matter of fact that ISPs have exercised editorial discretion
while providing broadband Internet access service.  “Extensive ISP fil-
media, moreover, the line between the media and others who wish to comment on
political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”).
192. See Enrique Armijo, Kill Switches, Forum Doctrine, and the First Amendment’s
Digital Future, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 411, 450–52 (2014) (noting the “reg-
ulation behind the screen” problem with respect to Internet censorship).  A com-
plete discussion of censorship by proxy is beyond the scope of this Article.  For a
detailed discussion of its history and dangers, see Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by
Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the
Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006).
193. See Armijo, supra note 192, at 451.
194. See Kreimer, supra note 192, at 17.
195. See id. at 22–27, 46; see also Bambauer, supra note 120, at 866 (“America has
begun to censor the Internet.”).
196. See Kreimer, supra note 192, at 57–65 (discussing proxy censorship issues in Su-
preme Court decisions applying the First Amendment to cable operators).
197. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 544.
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tering was much more common in the 1990s but still exists today.”198
A prime example is Jnet, a broadband ISP that automatically blocks
access to certain Internet sites based on their content.199  According to
Jnet, it engages in viewpoint-based discrimination because “there is a
large segment of the Jewish community that has avoided the Internet
entirely, and many more that are rightly concerned about using the
Internet” due to its objectionable content.200  Jnet does not offer its
end users the ability to bypass, disable, or route around its filtering
system—a decision that appears to be Jnet’s primary selling point.201
The content curation provided by Jnet and other ISPs is thus similar
in scope to that provided by television broadcasters and cable
systems.202
It is constitutionally irrelevant that Jnet and others that actively
promote their content curation appear to be outliers among ISPs.  To
the extent ISPs have refrained from exercising their right to editorial
discretion, the FCC’s factual findings in the Second Internet Order in-
dicate that their restraint was induced or compelled by the govern-
ment.203  The FCC found there is a continuing need for open Internet
rules because ISPs would have exercised editorial discretion if the
FCC had not previously prohibited or discouraged it.  According to the
FCC, the previous open Internet rules “helped to deter [ISPs’ exercise
of editorial discretion] while they were in effect” and, but for those
rules, ISPs would already be engaging in “such conduct.”204
Previous FCC decisions show it has been chilling ISP speech ever
since it began deregulating broadband Internet services.
198. Brent Skorup, The First Amendment, ISPs, and Net Neutrality: Will the Open
Internet Order Survive a First Amendment Challenge?, PLAIN TEXT (Sept. 3,
2015), https://readplaintext.com/the-first-amendment-isps-and-net-neutrality-7b
b5ec56b795, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/EMS2-TU7G.
199. Other examples of ISPs that routinely block legal content include Dnet and Clean
Internet. See id.
200. Frequently Asked Questions, THE JEWISH INTERNET ACCESS (2015), http://www
.thejnet.com/faq.asp, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/73KG-NB85.
201. Id.
202. ISPs and other Internet companies have also blocked or removed potentially of-
fensive content on an ad hoc basis in response to requests from the Anti-Defama-
tion League.  See Skorup, supra note 198 (citing Jessica S. Hendry, Beyond Free
Speech: Novel Approaches to Hate on the Internet in the United States, 18 INFO. &
COMM. TECH. L. 235 (2009)).
203. In contrast to the FCC, Congress encourages ISPs to exercise editorial discretion
in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1998), which immunizes ISPs from liability for any causes
of action due to ISPs’ dissemination of information originating with a third-party
and from civil liability for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive
material. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (stat-
ing that Congress enacted § 230 to remove ISP disincentives to self-regulation of
offensive content).
204. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 8.
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• When the FCC declared that cable ISPs are not common carriers
in 2002 it simultaneously asked whether and to what extent it
should restrict their editorial discretion.205
• When the FCC extended the cable broadband ruling to telephone
companies in 2005206 it simultaneously issued an Internet Policy
Statement announcing that it would take enforcement action if it
observed ISPs exercising editorial discretion207—a threat the
FCC fulfilled in 2008 when it ruled that an ISP had acted unrea-
sonably by interfering with peer-to-peer traffic.208
• From 2005 to 2011, the FCC used its merger review process to
impose binding open Internet obligations on the largest ISPs, in-
cluding AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast.209
In these circumstances, the FCC’s assertion that ISPs do not exercise
editorial discretion evidences nothing more than their compliance
with FCC rules and policies.  It has no probative value with respect to
their constitutional status as speakers.
The FCC’s theory that ISPs are not speakers based on their past
conduct also has no basis in law.  The protections of the First Amend-
ment would be rendered meaningless if the people could be forced to
forfeit their rights to free expression by virtue of their compliance with
government restrictions on speech.  Assume English law had required
colonial newspapers to publish all community opinions in the order
received, and that most newspapers had maintained the practice for
some period of time after the First Amendment was ratified.  Based on
the FCC’s reasoning in the Second Internet Order, newspapers would
not be entitled to the freedom of the press: they would have forfeited
that right by acting as conduits for the speech of others during their
transition from the customs of English rule to liberty.
It would be similarly absurd to conclude that ISPs had forfeited
their right to speak even if they had chosen to remain silent on a
purely voluntarily basis.  “[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitu-
tional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing
to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive sub-
ject matter of the speech.”210  Silence itself can be a powerful form of
205. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access, supra note 127.
206. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 130.
207. See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 134.
208. See Comcast Order, supra note 137.  Though this order was subsequently vacated
by an appellate court, the vacatur of the Comcast Order in early 2010 quickly led
to the issuance of a new FCC proceeding and the adoption of the First Internet
Order later that same year.
209. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 65.
210. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569–70
(1995).
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expression.211  Holding that a voluntary vow of silence is enough to
foreclose the constitutional right to speak in the future would chill si-
lence as a means of sending a message.  If the First Amendment is to
protect the full panoply of expression, the past silence of a speaker can
have no legal relevance.
The only constitutionally relevant question is whether ISPs have
the ability to speak prospectively, a fact the FCC conceded.  In the
Second Internet Order, the FCC found that ISPs have the “technical
ability” to speak through the exercise of editorial discretion.212  It
could hardly have done otherwise.  If ISPs could act as nothing more
than conduits for the speech of others in the absence of government
intervention, the FCC’s net neutrality rules would have been unneces-
sary.  The inherent contradiction between the FCC’s factual finding
that ISPs have the ability to speak and its legal conclusion that ISPs
are not deserving of First Amendment protection is a self-serving at-
tempt by the Commission to have its constitutional cake and eat it too.
If the open Internet rules are necessary to prevent ISPs from exercis-
ing editorial discretion, then it is axiomatic that ISPs are constitution-
ally protected speakers.
B. The Distinction Between Speech and Conduct
Even if the FCC’s conduit theory might have merit in some circum-
stances, it is inapplicable to the transmission of mass media content
by ISPs.213  There is no constitutional distinction between conduct
and speech with respect to the dissemination of mass media communi-
cations.214  The operators of mass media conduits do not need to sepa-
rately demonstrate “status as a speaker”215 to invoke the protections
of the Press Clause, because their conduct is inextricably intertwined
with speech.216  “The free press clause protects not only the words
211. See generally We Day, We Are Silent, FREE THE CHILDREN (2015), http://www
.weday.com/we-schools/campaigns/we-are-silent/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/X3DA-4TVZ (encouraging twenty-four hours of silence to support “the mil-
lions of girls around the world facing poverty, exploitation and the denial of their
right to education”).
212. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 78.
213. For example, it may be constitutional for the FCC to regulate Internet services
that do not involve mass media communications, such as point-to-point voice over
Internet protocol (VoIP) services, as common carrier services. See, e.g., Vonage
Holdings Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 489 F.3d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(holding that it was reasonable as a matter of statutory interpretation for the
FCC to regulate VoIP services by analogy to plain old telephone service).
214. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (“[T]here is no fundamental distinction between expression and
dissemination.”).
215. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 547.
216. See, e.g., Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959 (1984)
(noting that charitable solicitations are so intertwined with speech that they are
2016] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NET NEUTRALITY 589
which appear on a newspaper’s pages, but its printing and circulation
as well.”217  The “press” merited disjunctive mention in the First
Amendment because governments historically restricted speech
through laws controlling the physical machinery of the printing press
itself.218  The Press Clause ensures that mere operation of the
“potentially dangerous technology” of the printing press and its mod-
ern equivalents is “protected alongside direct in-person
communications.”219
In the Second Internet Order, the FCC relied on the O’Brien dis-
tinction between conduct and speech to conclude that the transmis-
sion of Internet communications is “pure” conduct that is not
protected by the First Amendment because ISP transmissions do not
intrinsically require the exercise of editorial discretion.220  According
to this “editorial quality theory,” the conduct of disseminating speech
is protected only if it consistently requires editorial discretion of suffi-
ciently high quality.
The FCC’s attempt to define the boundaries of the Press Clause
based solely on a theory of editorial quality is not supported by the
text of the First Amendment or the law interpreting it.  Just as the
Speech Clause contains no distinctions based on the relative elo-
quence of different speakers, the Press Clause does not distinguish
among different members of the press based on the relative intensity
of the editing processes they perform.221  A printer who offers whole-
sale publishing services with minor copy editing is as entitled to First
Amendment protection as the New York Times.222  The same is true
with respect to the particular content published by any particular
member of the press: the First Amendment is applicable to eloquently
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment); see also Comcast Cablevision
of Broward Cnty., Inc. v. Broward Cnty., Fla., 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 692 (S.D. Fla.
2000) (“In arguing that the conduit or transmission capability of speech can be
separated from its content, the [government] ignores the relationship between
the two.”).
217. Comcast Cablevision, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
218. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Miami
Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); see also Comcast Cablevision,
124 F. Supp. 2d at 694–95 (describing the historical context for the adoption of
the Press Clause).
219. Eugene Volokh, Is the Freedom of the Press “Redundant” of the Freedom of
Speech?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 4, 2011, 11:54 AM), http://volokh.com/
2011/04/04/is-the-freedom-of-the-press-redundant-of-the-freedom-of-speech/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/QGA5-TCKB.
220. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, paras. 547–49 (citing United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) and subsequent cases that rely on the O’Brien
distinction).
221. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
222. See id.
590 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:559
written editorials and crude advertisements alike.223  The Constitu-
tion gives the government no role in evaluating whether it is appropri-
ate or necessary for the press to exercise editorial discretion, because
experience has shown that the “ ‘liberty of the press is in peril as soon
as the government tries to compel’” the press to speak.224
The distinction between speech and conduct articulated by the
Court in O’Brien was intended as a means of determining the level of
First Amendment scrutiny applicable to “symbolic speech” involving
speech and nonspeech elements, not the dissemination of speech
under the Press Clause.225  The Court rejected the “view that an ap-
parently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea,” because “a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu-
lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations upon
First Amendment freedoms.”226  As Justice Harlan noted in his con-
curring opinion, however:
[This rationale does not foreclose the application of strict scrutiny] in those
rare instances when an “incidental” restriction on expression, imposed by a
regulation which furthers an “important or substantial” governmental inter-
est and satisfies the Court’s other criteria, in practice has the effect of entirely
preventing a “speaker” from reaching a significant audience with whom he
could not otherwise lawfully communicate.227
The conduct protected by the Press Clause is one of those instances.228
If disseminating mass communications was, in and of itself, consid-
ered mere conduct that is undeserving of First Amendment protection,
then the Press Clause would lose all meaning.
The Press Clause does not limit its protection to the conduct of edi-
torializing during initial publication.229  Even assuming the distribu-
tors of mass communications do not intend to express anything by
223. See Comcast Cablevision, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 695 (“[T]he First Amendment, as
[the Founders] wrote it, leaves no room for equivocation.”).
224. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (quoting 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERN-
MENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
225. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77.
226. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 388–89 (Harlan, J., concurring).
228. Few Supreme Court cases have involved outright bans on speech. See Denver
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 809 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
229. See id.; see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 768
(1988) (holding the conduct of placing newsracks involves “the circulation of
newspapers, which is constitutionally protected”); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (holding a city ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of
circulars “cannot be saved because it relates to distribution and not to publica-
tion”); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936) (invalidating tax spe-
cifically targeting newspapers because the First Amendment “was meant to
preclude the national government . . . from adopting any form of previous re-
straint upon printed publications, or their circulation” (emphasis added)).
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their choice of what to sell, such distributors would “still serve a vi-
tally important communications function protected by the First
Amendment.”230  The government is capable of repressing speech “by
silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the speech pro-
cess,” including the process of disseminating mass communications.231
Beginning with Ex parte Jackson in 1877, Supreme Court cases that
address systems for the dissemination of mass media communications
have uniformly held that their owners have a First Amendment right
to exercise editorial discretion.  In Ex parte Jackson, the Court held a
postal statute prohibiting the mailing of lottery documents did not vio-
late the First Amendment.232  It concluded that the power of Congress
“to establish post-offices and post-roads” includes the power to desig-
nate “what should be carried,” and that “[t]he right to designate what
shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall
be excluded.”233  The Court derived the right of the postal service to
discriminate against the speech of others from the rights of private
carriers.  As Justice Holmes later described it, “[I]f the Government
chose to offer a means of transportation which it was not bound to
offer it could choose what it would transport.”234  The Court subse-
quently held that this right to discriminate applies to over-the-air
broadcasting235 and cable television systems as well.236  It has con-
sistently recognized:
[T]he First Amendment, the terms of which apply to governmental action, or-
dinarily does not itself throw into constitutional doubt the decisions of private
citizens to permit, or to restrict, speech—and this is so ordinarily even where
those decisions take place within the framework of a regulatory regime such
as broadcasting.237
The same principle is equally applicable to mass media communica-
tions disseminated by ISPs on the Internet.
C. The Distinction Between Mass Media and Common
Carrier Communications
Those who subscribe to the editorial quality theory contend that
applying First Amendment protection to ISPs would be inconsistent
with precedent applying common carrier obligations to telegraph and
230. Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the
“Speaker” Within the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 86 (1995).
231. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
232. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 728 (1877).
233. Id.
234. See Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 141 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
235. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
236. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994).
237. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737
(1996).
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telephone companies.238  In their view, the distinction between com-
munications systems that are entitled to First Amendment protection
(e.g., broadcast and cable television) and those that are not (e.g., teleg-
raphy and telephony) is based on the quality of editorializing offered
by those services.239  They argue that, if courts were to hold that ISPs
are entitled to First Amendment protection, it would then invalidate
the application of common carrier principles to telephone as well.
If the editorial quality theory of the First Amendment were valid,
this concern might warrant consideration.  There is no need for a court
to address this hypothetical concern, however, because there is no in-
consistency between the protection of dissemination afforded by the
Press Clause and the law of common carriage under existing prece-
dent.  The constitutional distinction between the transmission of video
programming on the one hand and telephony on the other is based on
the type of speech they disseminate, not the degree of editorial discre-
tion carriers choose to exercise or are capable of exercising.  Non-dis-
crimination obligations were applied to telegraphy and telephony
because these services traditionally offered a means of private “inter-
communication” between individuals only.240  Telegraphy and plain
old telephone service were technologically incapable of publicly dis-
seminating speech directly to the masses in a manner similar to
broadcast and cable television.  The courts treated telegraph and tele-
phone companies as common carriers because they transmitted purely
private communications.
Jackson impliedly recognized this critical distinction in its consti-
tutional analysis of mail carriage.  The Court began by distinguishing
between the transportation of privately sealed mail that is intended to
be kept free from inspection (e.g., letters) and unsealed mail that is
open to public inspection (e.g., newspapers).  It concluded that sealed
238. Final Brief for Tim Wu as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Verizon v.
FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 11-1355), 2012 WL 5830083.  Even those
who concede that distribution is fully protected in the traditional print context
have nevertheless fallen into the analytical trap of assuming that the O’Brien
distinction and the editorial quality theory are relevant with respect to electronic
distribution under the Press Clause. See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 230, at
84–100.
239. Barbara Cherry has posited an “essentiality of access” standard. See Barbara A.
Cherry, Utilizing “Essentiality of Access” Analyses to Mitigate Risky, Costly and
Untimely Government Interventions in Converging Telecommunications Technol-
ogies and Markets, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 251 (2003).  However, her First
Amendment analysis has been superseded by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United. See Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Elimi-
nate Common Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY.
L. REV. 483, 506–07 (2006) (arguing the application of common carrier regulation
to ISPs would be consistent with the First Amendment to the extent the speech
rights of corporations are not coextensive with those of natural persons).
240. See Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 8 (1877).
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mail is protected by the Fourth Amendment right against searches
and seizures “as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them
in their own domiciles,” but that the “transportation” (i.e., dissemina-
tion) of unsealed mail by the postal service was protected by the First
Amendment.241  The Court held that the postal service was entitled to
the freedom of the press with respect to its carriage of unsealed mail
even though mail carriage does not require the same degree of editori-
alizing as initial publication.242  The Court held the freedom of the
press includes the dissemination of mass media communications be-
cause the “[l]iberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as
liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication
would be of little value.”243
The Jackson distinction between sealed and unsealed mail recog-
nized that “restricting speech on purely private matters does not im-
plicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters
of public interest.”244  It also recognized that, as a practical matter,
the content of private communications is generally protected from gov-
ernment interference by the Fourth Amendment, whereas mass media
content is not.245
The Court applied this distinction to telephony in Katz v. United
States, which held that government surveillance of words spoken into
a telephone receiver by a person who was using an otherwise public
telephone booth constituted a “search and seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment.246  In Katz, a case that has been described as “the most
important [Fourth Amendment case involving networks] since Ex
parte Jackson,”247 the Court concluded that a person making a tele-
phone call is “entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”248 Katz determined
that, like the transportation of sealed letters in the mail, telephone
calls are inherently private communications with no public aspect.
This distinction is also reflected in Jackson-era court decisions
analogizing telegraphy and telephony to the common carriage of goods
and persons by railroads.  For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals considered these services to be close analogs because telegraphy
and telephony services are capable of transmitting a particular com-
munication from only one person to one other person, just as railroads
241. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 728–33 (1877).
242. See id. at 733.
243. Id.
244. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011).
245. The First Amendment applies to private communications to the extent associa-
tional rights are implicated. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d
787, 802 (2d Cir. 2015).
246. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
247. See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 174 (9th Cir. 1978).
248. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
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transported a particular good or person from one place to another.249
The Sixth Circuit thought the analogy was even more “applicable to
telegraph companies than to telephone companies, for the one receives
and sends a message, the other merely supplies the facilities by which
the user may extend the compass of his own voice.”250  The Sixth Cir-
cuit’s description of telephony as a means of extending the range of
one’s voice is consistent with Katz’s treatment of telephone calls and
Jackson’s treatment of sealed mail as inherently private
communications.
Similarly, in Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., a case decided the same year as Jackson, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the transmission of communications by telegraphy or teleph-
ony to be a commercial activity with more similarity to the delivery of
sealed mail or the transportation of packages by rail than a means of
expressing ideas through mass communications.251  Though it did not
expressly address the First Amendment, the Court held that telegra-
phy was a form of “commercial intercourse” that could be regulated by
Congress under the Commerce Clause.252  The Court noted that more
than eighty percent of all the messages sent by telegraph related to
commercial transactions,253 but made no mention of the use of teleg-
raphy to disseminate communications directly to the masses.  This si-
lence, coupled with the Court’s contemporaneous decision in Jackson,
indicates telegraphy was not considered part of the press protected by
the First Amendment because the telegraph did not offer a means of
publishing or disseminating mass communications.
In Turner I, the Supreme Court implicitly held that the Press
Clause protects the mere dissemination of mass media communica-
tions in the cable television context.254  As a factual matter, the Court
acknowledged that, “Once the cable operator has selected the pro-
gramming sources, the cable system functions, in essence, as a conduit
for the speech of others, transmitting it on a continuous and unedited
basis to subscribers.”255  It nevertheless held that both the Speech and
Press Clauses applied to the operation of cable television systems.
“There can be no disagreement on an initial premise: Cable program-
249. See Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kelly, 160 F. 316, 318 (6th Cir. 1908); see also
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (“By the invention of the
telephone 50 years ago, and its application for the purpose of extending communi-
cations, one can talk with another at a far distant place.”), overruled by Katz, 389
U.S. 347.
250. Cumberland, 160 F. at 318.
251. See Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
252. See id. at 9.
253. See id. at 8.
254. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 629 (1994) (noting that cable systems in essence func-
tion as conduits for the speech of others).
255. See id.
2016] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NET NEUTRALITY 595
mers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are
entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the
First Amendment.”256  Just as the decision to carry the mail “necessa-
rily involves the right to determine what shall be excluded,”257 the
Court held a cable operator’s decision to transmit programming neces-
sarily includes a constitutionally protected right to exercise editorial
discretion.258
Supreme Court precedent thus indicates the constitutional line
drawn between sealed and unsealed mail in Jackson is the basis for
the traditional distinction between common carrier and mass media
communications, respectively.  A plain old telephone service provider
does not have a First Amendment right to exercise editorial discretion
over an ordinary telephone call because it is a private, one-to-one com-
munication that is not intended for public consumption.  In contrast, a
cable operator has a First Amendment right to exercise editorial dis-
cretion over the video programming it disseminates, even if the cable
operator is essentially acting as a conduit for the speech of others, be-
cause cable content is intended for consumption by the masses.259
Like mail carriers and cable operators, ISPs are entitled to First
Amendment protection to the extent they disseminate mass media
communications.  The degree of editorial discretion that ISPs choose
to exercise over the mass media communications they transmit is con-
stitutionally irrelevant.
D. The Implications of Denying First Amendment
Protection to ISPs
The question of whether ISPs have a right to invoke the First
Amendment has enormous constitutional implications.  If the FCC’s
decision were allowed to stand, the government would be free to pro-
hibit content providers and consumers from transmitting particular
viewpoints by enacting regulations that censor ISP transmissions
based on content.  The FCC’s decision to grant content providers and
consumers a right of access to ISP networks through regulatory decree
does not grant them a corresponding constitutional right to invoke the
protection of the First Amendment for content they transmit over ISP
networks.  No one has a First Amendment right to communicate using
mass communications systems or facilities owned or operated by an-
256. Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
257. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877).
258. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 636 (“Through ‘original programming or by exercising
editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire,’
cable . . . operators ‘seek to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and
in a wide variety of formats.’” (quoting Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc.,
476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986))).
259. See id. at 629.
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other person, and in the absence of a constitutional right to send and
receive ISP transmissions, no one has standing to challenge govern-
ment efforts to censor them.260
1. No Constitutional Right to Access Mass Media
Communications Systems
Supreme Court cases involving the freedom of the press have dealt
with governmental efforts to restrict the operators of mass media com-
munications systems, not governmental efforts to protect the right of
other people to access such systems,261 because there is no First
Amendment right to access mass media facilities.262
Drawing an analogy to the print media, for example, the author of a book is
protected in writing the book, but has no right to have the book sold in a par-
ticular bookstore without the store owner’s consent.  Nor can government
force the editor of a collection of essays to print other essays on the same
subject.263
Even in the broadcast context, which has traditionally been subject to
a lower level of First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court has
refused to hold that the government or any individual member of the
public has a right to use private broadcast systems to transmit their
views on any particular matter.264
The Court has repeatedly refused to recognize a constitutional
right of access to mass media facilities even when the facilities are
operated or controlled by the government itself.  In its decision up-
holding a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of lottery materials
in Jackson, the Court considered the possibility that, because the gov-
ernment had given itself a monopoly over the delivery of the mail, its
exercise of editorial discretion could have the effect of completely fore-
closing the transportation of speech with respect to lotteries.265  The
Court recognized that if Congress could prohibit the transportation of
newspapers over postal-routes by mail and private carrier alike, then
“the circulation of the documents would be destroyed, and a fatal blow
given to the freedom of the press.”266  The Court concluded that this
possibility was insufficient to overcome the government’s exercise of
editorial privilege, however, because Congress lacks the power to pro-
260. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 310–11 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
261. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
737–38 (1996).
262. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114,
126–27 (1981).
263. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 816 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
264. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 112–13
(1973).
265. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733–35 (1877).
266. Id. at 735.
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hibit the private transportation of matters that it chooses to exclude
from the mail.267
In Greenburgh, the Court held the First Amendment does not
guarantee the people a “right to deposit, without payment of postage,
their notices, circulars, and flyers in letterboxes which have been ac-
cepted as authorized depositories of mail by the Postal Service.”268
The Court affirmed that the First Amendment does not guarantee ac-
cess to property used to disseminate mass media communications
even when the communications service is owned or controlled by the
government, because “the State, no less than a private owner of prop-
erty, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use
to which it is lawfully dedicated.”269  It further concluded that
designating a letterbox as an “authorized depository” for the mail does
not transform it into a “ ‘public forum’ of some limited nature to which
the First Amendment guarantees access to all comers,” because mail
service is not a traditional First Amendment forum such as the public
streets or a park.270  The Court concluded that “it is a giant leap from
the traditional ‘soapbox’ to the letter-box designated as an authorized
depository of the United States mails,” and that the First Amendment
did not require it to make that leap.271
The Court has also recognized that a constitutional right to access
mass media communications would necessarily entangle the govern-
ment and the press.  If content providers and consumers had a First
Amendment right to access the Internet, it could result in a myriad of
new constitutional claims with potentially adverse consequences for
other government objectives.  Courts might have to “face the difficult,
and potentially restrictive, practical task of deciding which, among
any number of private parties involved in providing a program (for
example, networks, station owners, program editors, and program
producers), is the ‘speaker’ whose rights may not be abridged, and who
is the speech-restricting ‘censor.’”272  The interconnection dispute be-
tween Netflix and certain ISPs provides a timely example of the chal-
lenges involved when making such determinations with respect to the
Internet, a network of networks that disseminates content on a global
scale.  In a petition filed with the FCC, Netflix asserted that, when it
refused to pay Comcast for the provision of additional interconnection
267. See id.
268. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 126–27
(1981).
269. Id. at 129–30 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
270. See id. at 128–31; see also Armijo, supra note 192, at 436–37 (“[T]he conclusion
that a State-offered communications network would not be a traditional public
forum seems beyond meaningful dispute.”).
271. Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 131 (emphasis added).
272. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737
(1996).
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capacity and Comcast refused to provide it for free, their mutual cus-
tomers were effectively denied access to Netflix’s streaming video ser-
vice.273  Assuming their mutual customers had a First Amendment
right to access Netflix’s streaming video service, who abridged it—
Netflix or Comcast?  The FCC, citing “competing narratives,” has not
determined who should bear responsibility for degrading Netflix’s
streaming speeds.274  When an expert agency struggles to decide such
cases, it is difficult to see how the courts could be expected to resolve
them as a matter of constitutional law.
The concerns discussed above indicate there is no constitutional
right to access facilities operated by the press because such a right
would be antithetical to the purpose served by the Press Clause.  Jus-
tice Stewart aptly illustrated the dangers of attempting to second-
guess the separation of government and press embedded in the First
Amendment:
The First Amendment prohibits the Government from imposing controls upon
the press.  Private broadcasters are surely part of the press.  Yet here the
Court of Appeals held, and the dissenters today agree, that the First Amend-
ment requires the Government to impose controls upon private broadcast-
ers—in order to preserve First Amendment “values.”  The appellate court
accomplished this strange convolution by the simple device of holding that
private broadcasters are Government.  This is a step along a path that could
eventually lead to the proposition that private newspapers “are” Government.
Freedom of the press would then be gone.  In its place we would have such
governmental controls upon the press as a majority of this Court at any par-
ticular moment might consider First Amendment “values” to require.  It is a
frightening specter.275
This specter is no less frightening with respect to the Internet.  The
fundamental value of the First Amendment is avoiding the specter of
government control over mass media communications.  That value
cannot be reconciled with a government-protected right of the people
to access the Internet.
2. Lack of Standing to Invoke First Amendment Against
Government Censorship
In the absence of a First Amendment right, there is no standing to
bring a constitutional challenge against a government restriction on
speech.  It is an “established principle that to entitle a private individ-
ual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive
or legislative action he must show that he has sustained, or is immedi-
ately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that ac-
273. See Applications of Comcast Corp. & Time Warner Cable Inc. for Consent to
Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorization, Petition to Deny of Netflix, Inc.,
MB Docket No. 14-57, 29 FCC Rcd. 13597, 57 (Nov. 4, 2014).
274. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 200.
275. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 133
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tion.”276  “The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or
otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party . . . .”277
To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a complainant must have
more than a “generalized grievance” and “generally must assert his
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on
the legal rights or interests of third parties.”278  The essential stand-
ing question “is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on
which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons
in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”279  End users who
object to government censorship of ISP transmissions cannot meet the
direct injury requirement in their own right because they have no con-
stitutional right to speak using ISP networks,280 and they cannot ob-
ject on behalf of ISPs under the overbreadth exception because the
FCC ruled that ISPs do not have a constitutional right to control their
transmissions either.
In First Amendment cases involving allegations of overbreadth,
the Court has permitted complainants to assert the rights of another
party due to the possibility that the party who is actually engaged in
protected activity will refrain from that activity rather than risk pun-
ishment for his conduct in challenging the restriction.281  This excep-
tion “has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last
resort,” because declaring a statute overbroad on its face totally for-
bids its application “until and unless a limiting construction or partial
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deter-
rence to constitutionally protected expression.”282  To avoid unduly
limiting the government’s ability to proscribe conduct that inciden-
tally involves speech, the Court has held that this already limited ex-
ception to the standing requirement attenuates further as the
restricted behavior moves from “pure speech” toward conduct that is
otherwise constitutionally unprotected.283  According to the FCC, ISP
transmissions have moved so far toward “pure conduct” that they war-
rant no constitutional protection at all, which means there is no con-
stitutional right for end users to assert on behalf of ISPs under the
overbreadth exception even if it would otherwise apply.
276. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) (emphasis added) (quoting Ex parte Levitt,
302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
277. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 500.
280. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
consumers and non-federal regulators lacked standing to challenge the district
court’s lifting of certain provisions in the antitrust consent decree that led to the
breakup of the Bell telephone system).
281. See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 956–57
(1984).
282. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
283. See id. at 615.
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If end users have no constitutional right to access ISP networks
and ISPs are not constitutional speakers, then cases involving the
First Amendment right to receive information do not apply.284  The
right of a listener to receive information sought to be communicated is
a reciprocal right, not an independent one.285  For example, in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., the Court addressed whether the recipients of drug price infor-
mation had standing to challenge a restriction on commercial drug ad-
vertising.286  “Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker.  But
where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is
to the communication, to its source and to its recipients.”287  Based on
this reasoning, the Court concluded that the recipients’ standing was
contingent on the right of pharmacists to advertise: “If there is a right
to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising.”288
But, as noted above, a sender of information on the Internet has no
right to speak using an ISP and, according to the FCC, ISPs are not
speakers.  This leaves Internet users with no reciprocal First Amend-
ment right to receive information via the Internet upon which a First
Amendment challenge might stand.289
If the total lack of standing to challenge government censorship of
the Internet seems absurd, the absurdity is not in the standing re-
quirement—it is in the FCC’s notion that the operators of conduits
used for the transmission of mass media communications have no
First Amendment right to exercise editorial discretion like any other
member of the press.  A reviewing court could, in theory, attempt to
avoid this absurd standing result by overturning or ignoring Supreme
Court precedent holding there is no constitutional right to access mass
media communications.  But, given the strong preference of lower
courts for following Supreme Court precedent when deciding constitu-
284. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
867 (1982) (“This right [to receive information] is an inherent corollary of the
rights of free speech and press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.” (emphasis added)).
285. The right to receive information does not extend to the use of another person’s
property (in this instance, ISPs) for its receipt. See, e.g., Martin v. City of
Struthers, Oh., 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (“No one supposes . . . that the First
Amendment prohibits a state from preventing the distribution of leaflets in a
church against the will of the church authorities.”).  If the government is permit-
ted to censor speech on another person’s property (ISPs or, in the Court’s exam-
ple, a church), the right to receive information does not apply.
286. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 756 (1976).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 757.
289. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981)
(indicating that end users of the mail had no right to receive unstamped materi-
als in their mailboxes because the distributors of unstamped mail had no right to
use mailboxes).
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tional issues, it is unlikely that a reviewing court would choose that
route.
IV. LEVEL OF FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
Applying the First Amendment to ISPs does not automatically in-
validate the FCC’s net neutrality rules.  Government restrictions on
speech are upheld if the government justifies them under the applica-
ble level of judicial scrutiny.  A government restriction on protected
speech that is based on content or disfavors certain speakers is subject
to “strict scrutiny” and will be tolerated only upon a showing that the
restriction is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government
interest and that no less restrictive alternative would serve the gov-
ernment’s purpose.290  A government restriction that is speaker- and
content-neutral is subject to “intermediate scrutiny” and will be per-
mitted if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to
the suppression of free speech or the freedom of the press and does not
burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those
interests.291
A. ISPs Disseminate Print Media
In the mid-to-late twentieth century, the Supreme Court indicated
that the applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny depends in part
on the nature of the mass media in question.  The Court has tradition-
ally applied the strictest scrutiny to restrictions on the print media
(e.g., newspapers)292 and lesser levels of scrutiny to audiovisual media
(e.g., broadcast and cable television).293  Some believe the only way to
reconcile this differential treatment is by examining differences
among the media at issue.294  According to this school of thought, the
290. See Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC, 729 F.3d 137, 155 (2d Cir. 2013).
291. See id. at 155, 160.
292. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936) (stating the First
Amendment “was meant to preclude the national government . . . from adopting
any form of previous restraint upon printed publications, or their circulation”);
see also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (“And it also requires no
elaboration that the free publication and dissemination of books and other forms
of the printed word furnish very familiar applications of these constitutionally
protected freedoms [of speech and press].”); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (holding the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press
includes the distribution of books in bookstores).
293. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (“Where there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies
to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broad-
cast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”).
294. See, e.g., Richard A. Hindman, The Diversity Principle and the MFJ Information
Services Restriction: Applying Time-Worn First Amendment Assumptions to New
Technologies, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 471, 486–88 (1989) (“The Court’s decision to
uphold government mandated access to the electronic media under the FCC’s
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applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny is determined by evalu-
ating whether the mass media technology at issue more closely resem-
bles print or broadcast television.295
More recently, the Court has indicated that the nature of a particu-
lar mass media technology should be irrelevant to First Amendment
analysis.296  Though the Court has not directly overruled earlier opin-
ions justifying differential treatment of different types of mass media,
its reasoning in recent cases is inconsistent with the late twentieth
century pattern of applying lower levels of scrutiny to video media.  It
has indicated that “[r]apid changes in technology—and the creative
dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against
upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by
certain speakers,”297 and “whatever the challenges of applying the
Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles of
freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s com-
mand, do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communica-
tion appears.”298  In 2010, the Court acknowledged that both
newspapers and television networks are “important means of mass
communication in modern times,” and that modern speakers and me-
dia are entitled to the same First Amendment protection as “those
types of speakers and media that provided the means of communicat-
ing political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.”299  That same
year, the Court held the government cannot create new categories of
unprotected speech the government considers “too harmful to be
tolerated.”300
With respect to the FCC’s net neutrality rules, however, the courts
need not pass on the validity of late twentieth century precedent that
applies lower levels of scrutiny to the exercise of editorial discretion
over video programming.  Even if that precedent remains valid, strict
scrutiny would apply to the total ban on ISPs because broadband In-
ternet access services implicate the same core First Amendment
rights as traditional print media.  The Internet is a means of publish-
personal attack rules, and strike down a Florida personal attack statute mandat-
ing access to a newspaper, cannot be reconciled except by looking at the medium
involved.”).
295. See id. at 488.
296. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 814
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Over time, how-
ever, we have drawn closer to recognizing that cable operators should enjoy the
same First Amendment rights as the nonbroadcast media.”).
297. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010).
298. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
299. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353–54.
300. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472
(2010) (holding that depictions of animal cruelty are constitutionally protected))
(holding that video games are protected by the First Amendment).
2016] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NET NEUTRALITY 603
ing and disseminating newspapers and other texts that contain the
same type of purely political speech in the same type of media (print)
that has always been accorded strict First Amendment scrutiny.  The
Supreme Court recognized this reality nearly twenty years ago when
it described the Internet as a “dynamic, multifaceted category of com-
munication [that] includes . . . traditional print and news services.”301
The FCC misses the point when it claims that ISP services “more
closely resemble the ‘conduit for news, comment, and advertising’ from
which the Court distinguishes newspaper publishing.”302  There is “no
American tradition” of reviewing government restrictions on the dis-
semination of newspapers or other textual media under intermediate
scrutiny.303  The act of disseminating the news in print has been sub-
ject to strict scrutiny since at least 1877, when the Court ruled in
Jackson that the transportation of newspapers through the mail is as
essential to freedom of the press as their initial printing.304  In con-
trast to broadcast and cable television, the Internet is capable of deliv-
ering newspaper print directly to the masses, and it can do so more
rapidly than the mail.  Data from 2014 indicates the Internet has com-
pletely displaced the traditional role of the Postal Service in delivering
printed news for 18% of newspaper readers, with only 56% reading
newspapers exclusively in print and only 65.7% of daily newspaper
circulation occurring in print.305  According to the Newspaper Associa-
tion of America, 137 million U.S. adults read a hardcopy newspaper in
a typical week while newspapers printed and disseminated on the In-
ternet reached more than 145 million unique visitors in January 2014
alone.306  The shift toward digital consumption of newspapers is par-
ticularly pronounced for the nation’s largest newspapers, whose digi-
tal circulation is much greater than their circulation in print.  In 2014,
the New York Times reported an average weekday print circulation of
fewer than 650,000 newspapers but boasted 1.4 million in paid circu-
lation from digital editions.307
As an alternative means of disseminating newspapers, the In-
ternet functions as a modern equivalent to the unsealed mail at issue
in Jackson.  As such, the Internet should be entitled to the same level
of strict scrutiny that has always been applied to the publication and
dissemination of print media.
301. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
302. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 548 n.1694 (quoting Turner I, 512
U.S. 622, 636 (1994)).
303. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
304. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
305. See Newspapers: Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www
.journalism.org/2015/04/29/newspapers-fact-sheet/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/BZS4-LD76.
306. See The Evolution of Newspaper Innovation, supra note 187.
307. See Newspapers: Fact Sheet, supra note 305.
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B. The Rules Are Content-Based
Strict scrutiny is also applicable to the FCC’s net neutrality rules
because they are not content- or speaker-neutral.  The rules are
speaker- and content-based restrictions of speech on their face, be-
cause they eliminate any opportunity for an ISP to exercise its right of
editorial discretion while permitting the exclusion of speech for purely
technical reasons.  The rules prohibit blocking, throttling, or unrea-
sonably interfering with or disadvantaging lawful content unless the
ISP can demonstrate that it has a “primarily technical network man-
agement justification” for the exclusion.308  Permitting ISPs to dis-
criminate solely for content-neutral reasons indicates the real
government interest in the open Internet rules is to prohibit the exer-
cise of editorial discretion by ISPs.
1. The Rules Are Content-Based on Their Face
The reasonable network management exception reflects the FCC’s
finding that ISPs must exercise some control over their networks to
ensure “network security and integrity.”309  The FCC expressly found
that ISPs need the ability to alleviate network congestion by blocking,
throttling, or disadvantaging certain speech.310  This finding implic-
itly recognizes several facts:
1. Congestion—a form of blocking, throttling, and disadvantaging
speech without human agency—can and does occur on the
Internet;
2. To mitigate Internet congestion, ISPs might be required to
block, throttle, or disadvantage certain speech; and
3. If ISPs were prohibited from employing these practices to miti-
gate congestion, Internet users would be harmed.
These facts demonstrate that blocking, throttling, and disadvantaging
speech are not intrinsically harmful; these conditions are an inherent
and expected consequence of the Internet’s decentralized design.311
The FCC only deems these conditions to be harmful when they are
directed by ISPs for business-related reasons.312  Permitting ISPs to
block, throttle, and disadvantage certain speech for technical reasons
308. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at paras. 283–84.
309. Id. at para. 220.
310. See id. at paras. 218–20.
311. See, e.g., Predictable Network Solutions Ltd. & Martin Geddes Consulting Ltd.,
Response to Department for Culture, Media & Sport Consultation on Digital Com-
munications Infrastructure Strategy (Sept. 2014), http://www.martingeddes.com/
wp-content/uploads/Response-to-Digital-Communications-Infrastructure-Strat
egy-Consultation.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9U8Q-NSTQ (“ICT and
broadband services are affordable because they are statistically shared. This has
the consequence of making them ‘rivalrous’ resources, i.e. use for one purpose
impinges on the ability to support others.”).
312. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 216.
2016] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NET NEUTRALITY 605
only is another way of saying that the FCC considers these activities
to be harmful only when they constitute ISP speech.
The inapplicability of the reasonable network management excep-
tion to the prohibition against paid prioritization is an independent
reason the rules must be considered content-based.  In addition to
muzzling ISPs, the ban on paid prioritization restricts the speech of
end users who want to avoid naturally occurring Internet congestion
in an effort to ensure their particular viewpoint is heard.  The FCC’s
justification for restricting end-user speech in this manner—that paid
prioritization could have “chilling effects” on end users who are un-
willing or unable to pay for prioritization313—is inconsistent with fun-
damental First Amendment principles.  The Supreme Court has
rejected the notion that the government has an interest in equalizing
the relative ability of individuals or groups to speak314: “[T]he concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our soci-
ety in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment.”315
It is constitutionally irrelevant that the content-related restric-
tions in the open Internet rules also implicate ISP business con-
cerns.316  The commercial nature of the press does not deprive it of
First Amendment protection, because there is no constitutionally per-
missible way for the government to separate the business interests of
the press from its editorial function.317  The existence of “commercial
activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of ex-
pression secured by the First Amendment,”318 in part because even
the earliest printers were capitalists who were regarded as innova-
tors.319  The combination of the profit motive “with other motives that
were self-serving and altruistic, and even evangelistic, at times,”
played a role in the “rapid expansion of early printing industries.”320
The editorial and business interests of the press have always been in-
313. See id. at para. 127.
314. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010).
315. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976).
316. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (“The existence of ‘commer-
cial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression
secured by the First Amendment.’” (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463, 474 (1966))).
317. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); see also N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (“That the Times was paid for
publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact
that newspapers and books are sold.”).
318. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818 (quoting Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 474) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
319. See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE 22
(Cambridge Univ. Press et al. eds., 2009).
320. Id. at 23.
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extricably intertwined,321 and the First Amendment forbids govern-
ment attempts to unravel them.322
2. The Purpose of the Rules Is Content-Based
Even if the rules could be considered neutral on their face, strict
scrutiny applies because the virtuous circle theory and the gatekeeper
ideology on which it is premised are inherently related to the suppres-
sion of free expression.  When determining whether a regulation is
content-based “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consider-
ation.”323  Speech that does not burden or benefit speech of particular
content on its face is nevertheless content-based if “the Government’s
asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression.”324
The government interests cited by the FCC in the Second Internet Or-
der are all related to the suppression of speech.  The rationale in the
Second Internet Order indicates that the purported benefits of the vir-
tuous circle theory—encouraging broadband deployment and “promot-
ing the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media”325— are all dependent
on prohibiting ISPs from exercising editorial discretion in order to pro-
mote the speech of others.326  According to the FCC, ISPs have the
power to “limit Internet openness” because “[b]roadband providers’
networks serve as platforms for Internet ecosystem participants to
communicate . . . .”327
Though it describes the virtuous circle theory in terms of edge “in-
novation,”328 the FCC’s factual findings indicate that, in this context,
“innovation” is doublespeak for “speech.”  According to the FCC’s Six-
teenth Report on video competition, online video distribution ac-
counted for 63.87% of downstream Internet traffic on North American
fixed access networks in March 2014, with Netflix alone accounting
321. See id. (“It seems more accurate to describe many publishers as being both busi-
nessmen and literary dispensers of glory.”).
322. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 580 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Nor should the eco-
nomic motivation of a speaker qualify his constitutional protection; even Shake-
speare may have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward.”); see also
Comcast Cablevision of Broward Cnty., Inc. v. Broward Cnty., Fla., 124 F. Supp.
2d 685, 693 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (noting newspapers and cable operators are entitled
to First Amendment protection despite selling advertising).
323. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
324. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at
791).
325. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 554.
326. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315–16.
327. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at paras. 79–80 (emphasis added).
328. Id. para. 7.
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for over 34% of peak Internet traffic.329  This video traffic is not “inno-
vation”—it is the same type of mass media content that is distributed
by broadcasters and cable operators, as evidenced by the fact that this
online video content competes with television and cable content for
viewers.330  The FCC’s finding that most Internet traffic is the same
type of video content that has long been considered speech when it is
distributed by broadcast and cable television systems indicates that
the FCC considers “innovation” in the virtuous circle theory to be
largely synonymous with “speech.”  For the purpose of First Amend-
ment analysis, what the virtuous circle theory actually posits is that
non-ISP speech “enhances consumer demand, leading to expanded in-
vestments in broadband infrastructure that, in turn spark new
[speech] at the edge.”331
The FCC’s total ban on ISP speech is unconstitutional even if some
activity at the Internet’s edge is innovation that is unrelated to
speech.  The FCC has described the Internet as a “General Purpose
Technology” (GPT) that has an inherent potential for “innovational
complementarities,” and it is presumably these complementarities the
FCC seeks to promote through its net neutrality rules.332  That might
be a legitimate government interest in some contexts, but it is uncon-
stitutional to the extent the GPT is used to disseminate mass commu-
nications.  The First Amendment already accounts for the fact that
mass communications systems have “innovational complementaries.”
The abundance of speech enabled by mass communications has
been a catalyst for innovation since the invention of the Internet’s
predecessor GPT—the printing press.  In her two-volume masterwork,
The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, Elizabeth Eisenstein de-
tails how the invention of the printing press “revolutionized all forms
of learning”333 by fundamentally “alter[ing] methods of data collec-
tion, storage and retrieval systems and communications networks
used by learned communities throughout Europe.”334  Eisenstein
makes a persuasive case that the advent of printing “inaugurat[ed] a
new cultural era in the history of Western man”335 and, as Francis
Bacon described it in the seventeenth century, ultimately “changed
the appearance and state of the whole world”336 by enabling a
329. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Sixteenth Report, MB Docket No. 14-16, FCC 15-41, para.
260 (Mar. 31, 2015).
330. See id. at paras. 96–100.
331. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 7.
332. See FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, Pt. I, at 29
(Mar. 16, 2010), archived at http://perma.unl.edu./V4LV-Z2EQ.
333. EISENSTEIN, supra note 319, at 3.
334. Id. at xvi.
335. Id. at 33.
336. Id. at 43 (quoting FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM, Aphorism 129).
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“marked increase in the output of books and [a] drastic reduction in
the number of man-hours required to turn them out.”337  This ability
to disseminate more information with less labor meant that “a given
purchaser could buy more books at lower cost,”338 which in turn
spurred greater demand for books.339
It is no coincidence that Elizabeth Eisenstein’s analysis of early
printing’s impact on Europe’s culture and economy is remarkably sim-
ilar to the FCC’s virtuous circle theory of the Internet.  The primary
difference between the Internet and the printing press is that the In-
ternet can disseminate even more information even more quickly at
an even lower cost than physical printing.  The benefits described by
the virtuous circle theory are the history of the printing revolution
repeating itself in the Internet era.  Such history provides guidance
regarding the limits of appropriate government response to such revo-
lutions in the form of the First Amendment.
The Framers were undoubtedly aware of the myriad benefits of-
fered by mass communications when they drafted the Press Clause.340
Their primary concern was preserving the freedom of the press itself
from government influence.341  The right to free expression embodied
in the Speech and Press Clauses is a “precondition to enlightened self-
government and a necessary means to protect it,”342 and it is for these
reasons that free expression must prevail against government efforts
to censor particular content or particular speakers,343 including laws
that censor the operation of the press and the dissemination of the
mass communications it enables.  Whatever merit it might otherwise
have, the virtuous circle theory is not a valid justification for trumping
the First Amendment, because the Framers implicitly rejected the
very same theory when they drafted the Press Clause.
3. The Gatekeeper Theory Is Content-Based
Judicial precedent also indicates the “key insight” of the virtuous
circle theory—that ISPs have the ability to act as gatekeepers stand-
ing between edge providers and consumers344—is neither new nor
content-neutral.  The net neutrality rules based on this “insight” pre-
337. Id. at 44–45.
338. Id. at 72.
339. Id. at 73–75.
340. The effects of the printing press on culture and innovation were recognized as
early as the seventeenth century. Id. at 43–45.
341. See Comcast Cablevision of Broward Cnty., Inc. v. Broward Cnty., Fla., 124 F.
Supp. 2d 685, 694–95 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (noting that concerns expressed by the
anti-Federalists led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, including the First
Amendment).
342. Id.
343. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
344. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 20.
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sume that (1) the operators of mass media communications systems
are an intrinsic threat to expression, rather than an enabler of it; (2)
the government has authority to establish an enforceable right of ac-
cess to private mass media communications systems that eviscerates
the editorial discretion of the press; and (3) the government should
exercise that authority without regard to the scarcity of the medium
(e.g., the availability of competing alternatives) or the free expression
interests of ISPs.  These presumptions reveal the virtuous circle the-
ory as a cleverly repackaged and far more expansive version of the
traditional media access arguments the Supreme Court rejected in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.345
Tornillo held that a statute requiring newspapers to give political
candidates a right to equal space to respond to criticism of their
records violated the Press Clause.  The Court rejected arguments sub-
mitted by media access proponents in Tornillo that are substantially
the same as those cited by the FCC in support of its gatekeeper the-
ory.346  The Court detailed the contentions of access proponents that
(1) “economic factors” had made “entry into the marketplace of ideas
served by the print media almost impossible,” (2) competing newspa-
pers had been “eliminated in most of our large cities,” and (3) most
consumers subscribed to or read only their locally available newspa-
pers.347  Nevertheless, the Court concluded: “However much validity
may be found in these arguments, at each point the implementation of
a remedy such as an enforceable right of access necessarily calls for
some mechanism” for enforcement, and “if it is governmental coercion,
this at once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions
of the First Amendment,” including its prohibition on government ef-
forts to abridge the freedom of the press.348
Tornillo denied the claim that government restrictions on editorial
discretion in the form of compelled speech are content-neutral so long
as the press remains free to publish its own content.
The Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspa-
per.  The first phase of the penalty resulting from the compelled printing of a
reply is exacted in terms of the cost in printing and composing time and
345. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
346. Compare id. at 247–54, with Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at paras.
80–84.
347. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247–54.  Media access proponents theorize that when the
First Amendment was ratified “the press was broadly representative of the peo-
ple it was serving” and “[e]ntry into publishing was inexpensive.” Id. at 248.  Re-
cent scholarship posits that this account is “ahistorical, a postindustrial fantasy
of preindustrial print’s efficacy . . . .” TRISH LOUGHRAN, THE REPUBLIC IN PRINT:
PRINT CULTURE IN THE AGE OF U.S. NATION BUILDING, 1770–1870, at xx (2007).
Loughran’s research reveals that, “Even in 1800, most Americans lived beyond
the reach of any printed matter that was not produced by their own local printer
or privately sent to them through personal connections.” Id. at 21.
348. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
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materials and in taking up space that could be devoted to other material the
newspaper may have preferred to print.  It is correct, as appellee contends,
that a newspaper is not subject to the finite technological limitations of time
that confront a broadcaster but it is not correct to say that, as an economic
reality, a newspaper can proceed to infinite expansion of its column space to
accommodate the replies that a government agency determines or a statute
commands the readers should have available.349
In the Second Internet Order, the FCC attempted to avoid
Tornillo’s rationale by claiming that ISPs do not face the same eco-
nomic limitations as newspapers, because providing an Internet end
user with “access to one edge provider does not displace another.”350
This attempt to distinguish Tornillo is inconsistent with the FCC’s
most recent factual findings in other proceedings that were aimed spe-
cifically at (1) the technological capabilities of ISP networks, (2) con-
sumer demand for access to Internet content, and (3) the economics of
deploying more capable Internet networks.
One month before it issued the Second Internet Order, the FCC
found in its Broadband Progress Report that most ISP networks are
currently incapable of providing most consumers with “access to the
extensive and ever-expanding [voice, data, graphics, and video] offer-
ings available today or on the near horizon.”351  Based on its examina-
tion of the actual household usage of today’s consumers,352 the FCC
found that one edge provider does displace another when an end user
does not have “access to actual download speeds of at least 25 Mbps
and actual upload speeds of at least 3 Mbps (25 Mbps/3 Mbps),”353
because:
• “Americans increasing rely on broadband to perform multiple
functions, and consumers within a household routinely use mul-
tiple applications simultaneously;”354 and
• ISP offerings that do not meet the 25 Mbps/3 Mbps benchmark
cannot adequately support the simultaneous use of multiple con-
tent services that consumers demand.355
In other words, when one member of a household is using a sub-25
Mbps Internet connection to access the content of a particular content
provider, other members of the same household are precluded from
simultaneously accessing content offered by other providers.356  This
349. Id. at 256–57 (citations omitted).
350. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 559 n.1698.
351. 2015 Broadband Progress Report & Notice of Inquiry on Immediate Action to
Accelerate Deployment, GN Docket No. 14-126, FCC 15-10, para. 20 (Feb. 4,
2015).
352. Id. at para. 29.
353. Id. at para. 3.
354. Id.
355. See id. at para. 47.
356. See id.
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factual finding directly implicates the same editorial concerns that
drove the Court’s opinion in Tornillo.
Separate FCC findings indicate it is “a matter of economic real-
ity”357 that the virtuous circle does not create enough demand for all
ISPs to expand their bandwidth to meet the 25 Mbps/3Mbps bench-
mark even when the government provides financial assistance.  In its
Connect America proceeding, the FCC determined that it must provide
governmental financial support for the deployment of Internet infra-
structure in rural areas because deployment is commercially uneco-
nomic,358 but it has refused to provide funding for broadband
infrastructure that is capable of supporting simultaneous access to
multiple content streams.359  Two months before it issued the Second
Internet Order, the FCC found it would be too costly for the govern-
ment to support the deployment of rural Internet infrastructure at the
25 Mbps/3 Mbps level360 that the FCC found consumers demand.361
The FCC’s findings in its Broadband Progress Report and Connect
America Fund proceeding demonstrate that the economic reality faced
by ISPs is consistent with the economic considerations cited by the
Court in Tornillo.  Like newspapers, ISPs cannot “proceed to infinite
expansion of [their network] space to accommodate the [content] that
a government agency determines or a statute commands [Internet end
users] should have available.”362
Tornillo also forecloses the FCC’s contention that its rules are con-
tent-neutral because they “do not burden any identifiable speech.”363
The Court would have reached the same result even if the compulsion
to publish at issue had not been limited to the publication of rebuttals
by political candidates:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compul-
sory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion
by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the
First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors.  A news-
paper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising.  The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of
public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exer-
cise of editorial control and judgment.  It has yet to be demonstrated how gov-
ernmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
357. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
358. See CAF Notice II, supra note 94, paras. 4–10.
359. See Connect America Fund, Report and Order, WC Docket No. 10-90, FCC 14-
190, paras. 27–28 (Dec. 18, 2014).
360. Id.
361. Id. at para. 3.
362. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
363. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 556.
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First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time.364
This passage indicates that it does not matter whether a government
restriction on the editorial function of the press is related to the sup-
pression of identifiable speech: strict scrutiny applies.365
C. The Rules Are Speaker-Based
The record in the Second Internet Order proceeding demonstrates
that the FCC’s net neutrality rules impermissibly discriminate be-
tween ISPs and other Internet intermediaries that have the same
ability to act as gatekeepers between consumers on the one hand, and
service, device, application, and content providers on the other.366
Non-ISP gatekeepers, a category that includes the providers of mobile
operating systems and Internet search engines, have substantially the
same incentives and ability as ISPs to exercise gatekeeper control over
end users because:
• End users rely on these non-ISP gatekeepers to reach other end
users on the Internet;
• The end users of non-ISP gatekeeper services bear switching
costs that are substantially similar to those borne by ISP
subscribers;
• The markets for non-ISP gatekeeper services are typically more
concentrated (i.e., less competitive) than markets for broadband
internet access; and
• Non-ISP gatekeepers are routinely using their market position
to block or otherwise disadvantage lawful services, devices, ap-
plications, and content.367
This evidence—which was not disputed by the FCC—indicates that
non-ISP gatekeepers are indistinguishable from ISPs with respect to
the government interests identified in the Second Internet Order.368
364. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 n.24 (“[H]ow can the state force abstention from dis-
crimination in the news without dictating selection?” (quoting Z. CHAFEE, GOV-
ERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947))).
365. This principle applies to ISPs even if the holding in Tornillo is properly limited to
newspapers or print media, because ISPs disseminate newspapers, books, and
other print media. See supra section IV.A.
366. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 80.
367. See, e.g., Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, Reply Comments of the
Center for Boundless Innovation, GN Docket No. 14-28, at 27–33 (Sept. 15, 2014)
[hereinafter CBIT Reply Comments], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/D7JG-
CSB8 (noting, among other things, that Apple uses its exclusive control over its
mobile operating system to decide which applications it will allow iPhone and
iPad users to access over the Internet); see also Bambauer, supra note 120, at 874
(noting that Apple has blocked apps it considers offensive, including Pulitzer
Prize-winning cartoonist Mark Fiore’s app).
368. See, e.g., Armijo, supra note 192, at 414 (“[ISPs] like Comcast and AT&T; applica-
tion companies like Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, and Apple; and search and email
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The FCC nevertheless exempted all non-ISP gatekeepers from the
restrictions in its net neutrality rules without providing a reasoned
explanation for its decision.369  In its First Internet Order, the FCC
asserted that ISPs are “distinguishable from other participants in the
Internet marketplace” because ISPs “control access to the Internet for
their subscribers and for anyone wishing to reach those subscrib-
ers.”370  But the concerns underlying the FCC’s virtuous circle and
gatekeeper theories are not limited to control over access to the In-
ternet per se; they are concerned with access to particular content,
applications, services, or non-harmful devices (or classes thereof).
How can rules ensuring that mobile ISPs do not block, throttle, priori-
tize, or disadvantage broadband applications protect the virtuous cir-
cle when, as the undisputed evidence shows, the dominant providers
of mobile operating systems are currently engaging in those very same
practices?371  A more ominous possibility is that the exercise of gov-
ernment control over ISP networks is sufficient to enable government
censorship of Internet communications.  The FCC does not say, pre-
sumably because it does not like the answer: gatekeeper control at any
level of the Internet’s chain of distribution presents the same threat
on which the FCC rested its net neutrality rules, but it chose to apply
those rules to ISPs only.372  Whatever its stated intent, this discrimi-
natory choice “raises serious doubts” about whether the FCC was in
fact interested in protecting the virtuous circle or instead providing a
government-conferred advantage to the speech (and business plans) of
its favored Internet gatekeepers at the expense of ISPs.373
The FCC’s failure to offer a rationale for the discriminatory appli-
cation of its net neutrality rules is alone sufficient to support the ap-
plication of strict scrutiny.  Laws designed or intended to suppress or
restrict the expression of specific speakers require strict scrutiny374
because government discrimination “among different speak-
service providers like Google all retain the authority to make decisions affecting
the content and reach of digital speech.”).
369. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at paras. 186–224.
370. First Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 50 n.160.
371. The 30% “toll” on gross revenues that Apple Computer charges for every mobile
application that is accessed using its mobile operating systems is two to three
times higher than the returns the FCC has traditionally permitted telecommuni-
cations carriers to earn under its rate of return policies.
372. See, e.g., CBIT Reply Comments, supra note 367, at 28 (“By its own logic, the
gatekeeper theory applies to any participant in the Internet marketplace that is
capable of exercising gatekeeper control—which includes the provider of any ser-
vice that is capable of acting as an intermediary between (1) end users and (2)
other service, application, and content providers who access end users through
that intermediary service.”).
373. Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740 (2011).
374. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000).
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ers . . . may be a means to control content,”375 and
“[u]nderinclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the govern-
ment is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavor-
ing a particular speaker or viewpoint.”376  In the absence of a
reasoned basis for the FCC’s discriminatory treatment of Internet
gatekeepers, the rules must be deemed speaker-based.377
D. Cable Television Precedent Is Inapplicable
The FCC argues that strict scrutiny is inapplicable to the editorial
discretion of ISPs based on the Court’s decision to apply intermediate
scrutiny to cable television operators in Turner I.  This argument
misses the critical distinction between the mandatory access rights at
issue in Turner I and the FCC’s net neutrality rules: the “must carry”
rules at issue in Turner I are relatively limited in scope, whereas the
FCC’s net neutrality rules impose a total ban on the editorial discre-
tion of ISPs.
The “must carry” rules require cable operators to carry the signals
of a specified number of local broadcast television stations.378 Turner
I applied intermediate scrutiny to these rules because “the number of
channels a cable operator must set aside depends only on the opera-
tor’s channel capacity,” which means there is no danger that a cable
operator could avoid or mitigate its obligations by altering the pro-
gramming it offers subscribers.379  The Turner I Court expressly con-
trasted these circumstances with its holding in Tornillo, in which the
Court expressed concern that a newspaper could avoid its access obli-
gations by refraining from speech critical of political candidates.380
The total ban on editorial discretion imposed by the FCC’s net neu-
trality rules creates incentives for ISPs like those in Tornillo, not Tur-
ner I.  In its Second Internet Order, the FCC admitted its net
neutrality rules give ISPs an incentive to shift content, services, and
applications from the open Internet to an excluded category the FCC
dubbed “non-broadband Internet access services” (BIAS).381  It ac-
knowledged that these services “could be used to evade the open In-
ternet rules,”382 and emphasized that it would “act decisively in the
event that a broadband provider attempts to evade open Internet pro-
tections (e.g., by claiming that a service that is the equivalent of In-
375. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010).
376. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2740.
377. See id. at 2740 (noting that the state had singled out purveyors of video games for
disfavored treatment without giving a persuasive reason why).
378. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 630–32 (1994).
379. Id. at 644.
380. Id. (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974)).
381. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at paras. 207–12.
382. Id. at para. 212.
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ternet access is a non-BIAS data service not subject to the rules we
adopt today).”383  The FCC’s finding that ISPs could attempt to avoid
their access obligations by altering their approach to content is flatly
inconsistent with the Court’s justification for applying intermediate
scrutiny in Turner I.  Because the FCC’s net neutrality rules create
content-based incentives similar to those in Tornillo, strict scrutiny
applies.
E. The O’Brien Distinction Between Speech and Conduct Is
Inapplicable
The FCC also contends that intermediate scrutiny applies because
“they are triggered by a broadband provider offering broadband In-
ternet access services,”384 an activity that arguably combines speech
and nonspeech elements.  In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme
Court distinguished between government restrictions aimed at sup-
pressing speech (content-based restrictions to which strict scrutiny
applies) and restrictions aimed primarily at conduct that “inciden-
tally” burdens speech (content-neutral restrictions to which interme-
diate scrutiny applies).385  The Court was concerned that the
application of strict scrutiny to symbolic speech would require it to
“accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.”386
Jackson and its progeny indicate that the distinction between con-
duct and speech the Court adopted in O’Brien is not applicable to re-
strictions on the liberty of circulation.  First, regulations (e.g., net
neutrality) that strip the owners of mass media communications sys-
tems (e.g., ISPs) from exercising any degree of editorial control cannot
be considered “incidental” limitations on First Amendment free-
doms.387  Treating mere ownership and operation of a printing press
or its modern equivalents (e.g., Internet infrastructure) as mere con-
duct undeserving of strict scrutiny would destroy the liberty of circula-
tion.  The Press Clause could not serve its intended purpose—to
ensure the government cannot control speech by controlling the physi-
cal means of publishing and disseminating mass communications—if
less-than-strict scrutiny were automatically applied to the act of oper-
ating a mass communications system.  Otherwise, government prac-
tices the Framers plainly intended to abolish (e.g., press licensing
383. Id. at para. 207.
384. Id. at para. 553.
385. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
386. Id. at 376.
387. See id.
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laws388) would be accorded less demanding scrutiny than the dissemi-
nation of pornographic material.389  Second, applying strict scrutiny
to restrictions on the dissemination of mass communications by ISPs
or any other member of the press would not require the Court to “ac-
cept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled ‘speech.’”390  The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to
restrictions on the liberty of circulation since 1877 without accepting
that view, and applying strict scrutiny to the FCC’s net neutrality
rules would not require the Court to accept that view now.  The divid-
ing line between the dissemination of mass communications and “sym-
bolic speech” is not difficult to discern.
V. APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
If a court applies strict scrutiny to the FCC’s net neutrality rules,
the reasoning in Tornillo indicates the reviewing court would be
bound to hold that the rules are unconstitutional.  Though it requires
additional analysis, a reviewing court should reach the same result
even if it decides to apply intermediate scrutiny.  To meet its burden
under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, the FCC must demonstrate
that its net neutrality rules will in fact advance the government’s as-
serted interests in a direct and material way without burdening sub-
stantially more speech than necessary.391  The FCC failed to meet this
burden392 with respect to all three government interests it asserted:
(1) promoting broadband deployment, (2) encouraging Internet inno-
vation, and (3) assuring a diversity of non-ISP speech.393
A. Assuring a Diversity of Non-ISP Speech
The government’s interest in assuring diversity of speech is easily
dismissed even under less stringent, intermediate scrutiny, because
the total ban on editorial discretion of ISPs in the net neutrality rules
388. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 335 (2010) (“These
onerous restrictions thus function as the equivalent of . . . licensing laws imple-
mented in 16th- and 17th-century England, laws and governmental practices of
the sort that the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit.”).
389. See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (applying strict
scrutiny to a statute restricting sexually explicit materials on the Internet).
Though it applies strict scrutiny, the Court has indicated that pornographic ma-
terial lies at the periphery of First Amendment concern. See United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 84 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing cases
indicating the same).
390. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
391. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).
392. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“When First
Amendment compliance is the point to be proved, the risk of non-persua-
sion . . . must rest with the Government, not with the citizen.”).
393. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at paras. 554–55.
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does not meet the narrow tailoring requirement.  The FCC’s declara-
tion that its net neutrality “rules are structured to operate in such a
way that no speaker’s message is either favored or disfavored”394 erro-
neously assumes that ISPs have no right to exercise editorial discre-
tion.395  With nary a hint of irony, the FCC concluded in its Second
Internet Order that bright-line rules banning the editorial discretion
of the press have only a “minimal” effect on speech396 and suggested
that the ability of the press to exercise editorial discretion is intrinsi-
cally inimical to the “values central to the First Amendment.”397  The
FCC’s analysis thus embraced the application of traditional media ac-
cess theory to the Internet—that “the source of centralized authority
that threatens” speech has shifted from the government to private cor-
porations398—and that the values embodied in the First Amendment
should similarly shift.
The Constitution cannot be shifted so easily.  Though the Supreme
Court has permitted the government to impose limited restrictions on
the editorial discretion of cable television operators, it has refused to
“ignore the expressive interests of cable operators altogether.”399
Whatever interest the government has in assuring a diversity of
speech generally cannot be used to justify a total ban on a particular
type of speech or a particular category of speaker—especially when
that type and category is an essential part of the press.
A contrary view would invite the government to pick and choose
among speakers based on its own cost-benefit analysis: in this in-
stance, that edge speech is more valuable than ISP speech.  The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly and “emphatically rejected [the] ‘startling
and dangerous’ proposition” that the First Amendment permits the
government to balance the social costs of suppressing the speech of
some with the purported benefits it might have for others.400  “The
First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people
that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the
costs.  Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judg-
ment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”401  The
FCC’s notion that the ability of ISPs to exercise editorial discretion
394. Id. at para. 553.
395. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 747
(1996) (noting that cable operators have legitimate expressive interests in the
First Amendment context).
396. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 556.
397. See id. at paras. 556–57 (concluding the ability of ISPs to exercise editorial dis-
cretion is a “special characteristic justifying differential treatment” of ISPs as
compared to other speakers).
398. See SBC and AT&T Applications, supra note 135.
399. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 747–48.
400. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (quoting United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
401. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
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while providing a means of mass communications is a “special charac-
teristic” that justifies government restraint is anathema to the pur-
pose of the Press Clause, which is to protect the editorial discretion of
the press from government interference, not to protect private individ-
uals from the press.  Neither a federal agency nor a reviewing court is
permitted to revise the judgment of the American people—embodied
in the First Amendment—that the benefits of the First Amendment’s
restrictions on the government outweigh its costs.402
B. The Gatekeeper Theory Is Unsupported by Substantial
Evidence
With respect to the government’s interests in promoting innovation
and broadband deployment, the FCC failed to meet its burden of dem-
onstrating that the harms posited by the gatekeeper theory are real or
that its net neutrality rules will advance403 the government’s asserted
interests in promoting broadband deployment and innovation.  The
FCC must do more than claim the virtuous circle and gatekeeper theo-
ries are reasonable in the abstract.  “[I]f intermediate scrutiny is to
have any bite, we can’t just trot out all of the reasons the government
advances in support of the regulation and salute.”404  The government
must prove that “the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural,
and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct
and material way.”405  The evidence the FCC presented in support of
its virtuous circle and gatekeeper theories falls well short of this
standard.
The core of the virtuous circle theory—that activity at the edge of a
communications network tends to increase demand for the network’s
services—describes a positive form of the economic principle com-
monly known as “network effects.”  “For example, ‘[a]n individual con-
sumer’s demand to use (and hence her benefit from) the telephone
network . . . increases with the number of other users on the network
whom she can call or from whom she can receive calls.’ ”406  Acknowl-
edging this principle’s mere existence, however, is not enough to jus-
tify the complete abnegation of ISPs’ First Amendment right to
402. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.  Those who claim the government can force “new
media” to “carry the expression of others” ignore issues related to governmental
censorship by proxy. See Meyerson, supra note 230, at 83.
403. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).
404. Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 736 F.3d 1192, 1212 (9th Cir. 2013)
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2874 (2014).
405. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664.
406. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting How-
ard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001)).
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exercise editorial discretion.407  At a minimum, the FCC must ex-
amine all relevant data and articulate satisfactory explanations for its
actions.408  It did not do so in the Second Internet Order.
The FCC failed to consider that, like all two-sided markets that are
subject to network effects, the potential benefits of positive network
effects on the Internet “can go either way.”409  The gatekeeper theory’s
conclusive presumption—that permitting ISPs to exercise editorial
discretion would reduce innovation and demand for broadband In-
ternet access service—contradicts the “the most famous law in eco-
nomics, and the one economists are most sure of,” the law of
demand.410  This law “states that when the price of a good rises, the
amount demanded falls, and when the price falls, the amount de-
manded rises.”411  Absent a showing that ISPs have market power,
demand theory presumes that ISPs have strong economic incentives
to create additional consumer demand for Internet access services by
lowering their prices or increasing their output (e.g., upgrading their
network infrastructure) using revenue gleaned from edge provid-
ers.412  In competitive markets, ISPs have their own incentives to pro-
mote the positive network effects described by the virtuous circle
theory, and their incentives to increase demand for their own broad-
band access services tend to offset whatever incentives they might
have to disfavor particular content.413  The question is, to what extent
and in what circumstances do the incentives of ISPs to promote the
virtuous circle theory offset their incentives to undermine it—a ques-
tion that requires the type of market analysis the FCC declined to
undertake.414
The FCC’s conclusion that market power is irrelevant to the gate-
keeper theory of harm apparently assumed the law of demand does
not exist.  In its Second Internet Order, the FCC determined that all
ISPs act as gatekeepers even in competitive markets, and that “when
407. See id. at 83–84 (noting failure to demonstrate that network effects were signifi-
cant enough to confer monopoly power).
408. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Fresno Mobile
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 165 F.3d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (applying the arbitrary
and capricious standard to the Administrative Procedure Act).
409. See DE SOLA POOL, supra note 189, at 76 (“[T]he synergy between postal delivery
and other businesses, like newspaper publishing, can go either way.”).
410. David R. Henderson, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Demand, LIBR. OF
ECON. & LIBERTY (2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Demand.html,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6H32-5PKV.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. See, e.g., MTS Mkt. Structure, supra note 88, at para. 109 (noting that when there
are competitive alternatives, forcing heavy users to pay inefficiently high rates
gives such users incentives to switch to another network).
414. Economists answer this question based on relative market power, but the FCC
refused to conduct a market-power analysis.
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a broadband provider acts as a gatekeeper, it actually chokes con-
sumer demand for the very broadband product it can supply.”415  This
determination is directly inconsistent with the law of demand, yet the
FCC did not attempt to articulate why the otherwise universally ac-
cepted law of demand is inapplicable to ISPs.
• The FCC concluded there was “no persuasive reason to be-
lieve”416 that ISPs would actually lower prices or increase out-
put if they were permitted to charge edge providers for access to
ISP networks without considering how the law of demand would
influence ISPs’ pricing and investment decisions.417
• The FCC did not attempt to quantify the extent to which edge
“innovation” would be reduced in the absence of net neutrality
rules or the extent to which any such reduction would be offset
by operation of the law of demand.418
• The FCC concluded that net neutrality rules prohibiting ISPs
from controlling their networks would prompt ISPs to invest
substantial capital in new broadband infrastructure without
considering the market-based incentives for investment de-
scribed by the law of demand.419
• The FCC concluded the potential benefits of its virtuous circle
and gatekeeper theories outweigh the benefits of lower retail
prices and increased output of ISPs predicted by the law of de-
mand, but it reached this conclusion without attempting to
quantify either.420
In the absence of this analysis, it is impossible to know whether net
neutrality rules are likely to produce any broadband deployment or
innovation at all, let alone a direct and material increase.
To the extent the FCC considered the investment incentives of
ISPs, its consideration of the issue was limited to the reclassification
of BIAS as a Title II service.421  The FCC’s decision to analyze the law
of demand separately from the FCC’s justification for imposing net
415. Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 20.
416. See First Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 40.
417. In its Second Internet Order, the FCC did not discuss the incentives of ISPs to
promote the virtuous circle in order to create additional demand for their broad-
band services. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at paras. 79–84.
418. See id.
419. See id.
420. See id.  The FCC did not acknowledge that the 1996 Act presumes communica-
tions companies will lower prices or increase output in competitive markets,
which indicates that, to the extent there was a lack of evidence in this respect, it
was due at least in part to the FCC’s refusal to conduct a proper market analysis.
The FCC also failed to acknowledge the lack of any evidence that edge providers
would actually lower their prices or increase their output as a result of the FCC’s
decision to exempt them from paying ISPs for access to their networks or for the
prioritization of edge services.
421. See id. at paras. 409–25.
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neutrality rules disguises the fact that the law of demand gives ISPs
incentives to support the virtuous circle that tend to offset their incen-
tives to disfavor content.  The FCC’s analysis of demand in the context
of the reclassification issue—which found that demand for increased
Internet traffic would “provide a strong incentive for broadband prov-
iders to continue to invest in their networks” irrespective of the FCC’s
net neutrality rules—appears to be at odds with the FCC’s finding
that its net neutrality rules are justified by the need to promote broad-
band deployment.422  It was unreasoned decision-making to ban ISPs’
editorial discretion merely because ISPs “could act in ways that would
ultimately inhibit” demand for their broadband services423 without
considering whether, or to what extent, that possibility is reduced or
eliminated by the benefits ISPs would derive from increased
demand.424
If the FCC had analyzed ISPs’ competing incentives, then it would
have been required to acknowledge evidence that the imposition of
strict common carrier regulation on ISPs tends to shift the potential
benefits of additional broadband deployment from ISPs to so-called
edge companies, which also tends to inhibit the deployment of new
infrastructure.425  It is well known that access regulations deter in-
vestment by imposing the highest risk on network operators while
shifting the highest returns to access seekers.426  In the context of net-
work unbundling, Congress and the courts have both recognized that
government-mandated access “is not an unqualified good”427 and per-
mitted its use only when “necessary” to remedy a market impairment,
because mandatory access rights create disincentives to innovation
and investment in networks.428  This evidence indicates that, to the
extent the open Internet rules enable content providers to extract
more profit from the potentially risky network investments of ISPs,
422. See id. at para. 412.
423. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
424. Standard economic theory indicates that market forces ultimately balance these
incentives in effectively competitive markets.
425. See, e.g., European Comm’n, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact As-
sessment, SWD(2013) 329 Final, at 44–45 (Nov. 9, 2013), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/78PA-32MX (noting that investment in next generation networks re-
quires “large and sunk investment” coupled with uncertainty regarding the po-
tential to obtain an adequate return on those investments and that prohibiting
wholesale price regulation for access to next generation networks “would allow
the network operators and access seekers to share some of the risk”); Commission
Recommendation on Consistent Non-Discrimination Obligations and Costing
Methodologies to Promote Competition and Enhance the Broadband Investment
Environment 2013/466/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 251), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
VL34-ZW6C.
426. See id.
427. U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
428. See U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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the rules will in fact deter broadband deployment and innovation, not
advance it.
C. The Gatekeeper Theory Is Inconsistent with Established
Precedent
The FCC’s gatekeeper theory is also inconsistent with well-estab-
lished judicial precedent and statutory provisions governing common
carriers that the agency did not consider.  Though agencies are not
irrevocably bound by precedent, “reasoned decisionmaking necessarily
requires consideration of relevant precedent.”429  The First and Sec-
ond Internet Orders did not “supply a reasoned analysis indicating
that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not
casually ignored.”430
1. Telegraphy and Telephony
The prohibitions in the FCC’s net neutrality rules extend well be-
yond what has previously been considered reasonable under common
carrier laws governing telegraphy and telephony services.  There is no
traditional common carrier counterpart to the FCC’s new bright-line
rule prohibiting ISPs from accepting payment or other consideration
for the prioritization of content, applications, services, or devices.431
The FCC’s claim that paid prioritization practices invariably “harm
consumers, competition, and innovation, as well as create disincen-
tives to promote broadband deployment”432 is directly contradicted by
over a century of jurisprudence.  In Western Union, a 1901 case ad-
dressing alleged discrimination by a telegraph operator, the Supreme
Court noted that the non-discrimination obligation applicable to carri-
ers at common law permitted them to charge one end user a higher
rate than another when differences affecting the expense or difficulty
in performing the services fairly justify the difference in rates.433  In
stark contrast to the FCC’s conclusion in the Second Internet Order,
the Court declared that “no one can doubt the inherent justice” of per-
mitting a common carrier to offer different services and to charge dif-
ferent rates for them.434  At common law, which draws its weight and
authority from customs that have proven successful since time out of
mind,435 “There is no cast iron line of uniformity which prevents a
429. Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co., L.P. v. F.E.R.C., 475 F.3d 319, 326 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
430. Id. (quoting Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251,
1296 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
431. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 125.
432. Id.
433. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, 97–100 (1901).
434. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
435. See id. at 101–02 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 67 (1765)).
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charge from being above or below a particular sum, or requires that
the service shall be exactly along the same lines.”436
Congress has not imposed cast iron lines of uniformity on common
carriers either.  The Communications Act does not require a common
carrier to provide “[a]bsolute equality of access” to its facilities.437  It
prohibits only “unjust or unreasonable discrimination” by common
carriers,438 requires them to provide service only when the request is
“reasonable,”439 and mandates that their charges and practices be
“just and reasonable.”440  The Communications Act expressly provides
that “communications by wire or radio subject to this chapter may be
classified into day, night, repeated, unrepeated, letter, commercial,
press, Government, and such other classes as the Commission may
decide to be just and reasonable, and different charges may be made
for the different classes of communications.”441  The public interest
standard applicable to common carriers is “essentially one of reasona-
bleness” with respect to business practices, not absolutes.442  This
“necessarily implies that departures from total equality are permissi-
ble and may be required to achieve Communications Act goals other
than the elimination of discrimination or preferences.”443
The net neutrality rules’ bright lines and the gatekeeper theory’s
repudiation of competition and the law of demand are inconsistent
with the statutory standard of reasonableness and its emphasis on
competition and private negotiation in the first instance.444  As dis-
cussed in section II.A above, Congress expressly presumed that the
law of demand is applicable to communications services when it
adopted the 1996 Act,445 and expressed a statutory preference for pri-
vate negotiation of individualized agreements to determine the rea-
436. Id. at 100.
437. See S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1009–10 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
438. See 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1989).
439. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1934).
440. See id. § 201(b).
441. Id.
442. See Rogers Radio Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 751 F.2d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir.
1985); see also MTS Mkt. Structure, supra note 88, at para. 97 (“Section 202(a) of
the Communications Act does not require total equality of rates at all times or
under all circumstances.”).
443. MTS Mkt. Structure, supra note 88, at para. 97.
444. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(1) (1999), 252(a) (1996) (requiring incumbent local
exchange carriers to provide access to their networks by privately negotiating in
good faith the terms and conditions of individualized agreements in the first
instance).
445. The Preamble to the 1996 Act states that its purpose is “[t]o promote competition
and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services,”
which describes the impact of the law of demand (lower prices or increased out-
put) in deregulated, competitive markets.  Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
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sonableness of particular business practices related to network
access.446  Congress’s decision to exempt “information services” from
Title II regulation was based on the FCC’s own decision that, in mar-
kets subject to competition, “the very presence of Title II requirements
inhibits a truly competitive, consumer responsive market.”447  The
1996 Act’s Preamble and its provisions embraced the FCC’s earlier de-
cisions to limit invasive Title II regulation to monopoly markets and to
deregulate competitive markets.  The FCC’s casual rejection of the law
of demand signals its return to the natural monopoly theory of com-
munications regulation accompanied by a newfound disregard for the
constitutional distinction between common carrier and mass media
communications and prior precedent interpreting the reasonableness
limit in Sections 201 and 202 of the Communications Act.
It is impossible to square prior precedent interpreting the Commu-
nications Act’s reasonableness standard with the Second Internet Or-
der’s conclusion that it is inherently unreasonable for an ISP to
manage Internet traffic for “business” reasons.448  The FCC and the
courts have long authorized common carriers to block, prioritize, and
discriminate against particular traffic, end users, or other carriers for
purely business reasons.  For example, in Rogers Radio v. FCC, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the refusal of a wireline car-
rier (IBT) to provide additional Inward-bound Wide Area Telephone
Service (INWATS) lines to a requesting wireless carrier (Rogers) on a
non-compensatory basis did not violate the reasonableness require-
ment in Section 201 of the Communications Act.  The court “could di-
vine no basis” for concluding that it would be “reasonable” to require
IBT to either (1) provide additional lines to Rogers at a loss, or (2)
raise its own subscriber rates.449
First, it cannot reasonably be disputed that IBT could provide INWATS inter-
connection to Rogers’ machines only at a loss.  If IBT were to incur such a loss,
it is also undisputed that it would be necessary to offset that loss by increased
charges to other IBT customers.  It simply cannot reasonably be said that the
ALJ erred in finding that IBT’s refusal to require, in effect, its other custom-
ers to subsidize Rogers was reasonable and in the public interest.450
What the D.C. Circuit considered irrefutably unreasonable in Rog-
ers is exactly what the FCC’s net neutrality rules now require of ISPs.
For example, if Netflix decides to provide its video programming in a
higher definition format than a particular ISP’s network can accom-
modate, and the ISP upgrades its facilities in order to transmit that
traffic, the net neutrality rules require the ISP to recover the cost of
446. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371–73 (1999).
447. See Computer II, supra note 53, at para. 109 (emphasis added).
448. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 18 n.18, para. 32.
449. See Rogers Radio Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 751 F.2d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
450. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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upgrading its facilities from its own subscribers only.  The ISP would
thus be required to “increase its rates for all of its subscribers to cover
the additional costs imposed by Netflix—including its subscribers who
don’t use the Netflix service.”451  As a result, ISP subscribers who do
not use Netflix as their video programming service provider would be
required to subsidize the delivery of Netflix content to their neighbors
while giving Netflix a significant price advantage over its competi-
tors.452  This is a very different version of “just and reasonable” than
that recognized by the Supreme Court in Western Union and the D.C.
Circuit in Rogers.
2. Broadcast and Cable Television
The FCC’s virtuous circle and gatekeeper theories are also incon-
sistent with judicial and statutory law governing the delivery of audio
and video content, which has always been exempt from comprehensive
common carriage requirements on First Amendment grounds.453  The
Communications Act expressly exempts broadcasters from regulation
as common carriers,454 and requires that the FCC regulate cable ser-
vice and multichannel video programming distribution (MVPD) ser-
vices under Title VI, not the common carrier provisions in Title II.455
Congress exempted television and radio broadcasting from Title II
regulation because “in the area of discussion of public issues Congress
chose to leave broad journalistic discretion to the licensee.”456  Con-
gress exempted cable and MVPD services for the same reason.457
“Congress’ flat refusal to impose a ‘common carrier’ right of access for all per-
sons wishing to speak out on public issues,” was perceived as consistent with
other provisions of the 1934 Act evincing “a legislative desire to preserve val-
ues of private journalism.”  Notable among them was § 326 of the Act, which
enjoins the Commission from exercising “ ‘the power of censorship over the
radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station,’” and com-
mands that “ ‘no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
451. Fred Campbell, Netflix Blocking Internet Access to HD Movies, CBIT BLOG (Jan.
17, 2013), http://cbit.org/blog/2013/01/netflix-blocking-internet-access-to-hd-mov-
ies/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/W6PC-NRZV (emphasis omitted).
452. Id.
453. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 702–03 (1979); see also CLARENCE
C. DILL, RADIO LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 102 (1938) (“The provisions of Ti-
tle II relating to Service and Charges do not apply to broadcasting stations.”).
454. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2010) (“[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting shall
not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.”).
455. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(6), (13) (1996).  The common carrier exemption for broadcast
services does not explicitly limit the regulation of cable and MVPD services, but
the definitions of cable service and MVPD accomplish the same end result. See
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 706.
456. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 703 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Dem-
ocratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973)).
457. Esbin, supra note 185, at 84.
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Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of
radio communication.’”458
The Supreme Court has determined that exempting broadcasting ser-
vices from common carriage regulation “manifests a congressional be-
lief that the intrusion worked by such regulation on the journalistic
integrity of broadcasters [and MVPDs] would overshadow any benefits
associated with the resulting public access.”459  The Court noted that
the force of this congressional reasoning “is not diminished by the va-
riant technology involved in cable transmissions.”460  Yet, in its Sec-
ond Internet Order, the FCC reached the exact opposite conclusion
with respect to the dissemination of audio and video programming by
ISPs.461
Though Congress imposed some common carrier-like restrictions
on cable operators (e.g., must-carry rules), Title VI does not impose a
bright-line prohibition on discrimination by MVPDs against content
providers via exclusive programming agreements.462  Title VI im-
posed a temporary, per se prohibition on certain discrimination by
cable television operators who have traditionally had substantial mar-
ket power, but in 2012, the FCC allowed this prohibition to expire.463
The FCC found that, because cable operators now have less market
power than when the non-discrimination provision was adopted, “a
preemptive ban on exclusive contracts sweeps too broadly.”464  It is
strange that the FCC reached the opposite conclusion in the Second
Internet Order, especially when it had already proposed to define on-
line video distributors as MVPDs only a few months previously.465
The Communications Act has never subjected broadcasters or non-
cable MVPDs to rate regulation or broad transparency requirements.
Cable operators are subject to rate regulation when they have market
power, but the FCC recently adopted a rebuttable presumption that
cable operators are now subject to effective competition in all markets,
which prohibits a local franchising authority from regulating cable
rates unless it demonstrates the cable operator in fact has market
458. See Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 704 (citations omitted) (quoting Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 412 U.S. at 110).
459. Id.
460. Id. at 706.
461. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at paras. 555–56 (finding the Internet
platform is different and “[t]he effect on speech imposed by these [net neutrality]
rules is minimal”).
462. 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(C) (1996) (limiting temporary exclusive contract prohibition
to cable operators and their affiliates).
463. See Revision of the Comm’ns Program Access Rules, Report and Order, Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Order on Reconsideration, MB Docket Nos. 12-
68, 07-18, 05-192, 07-29, FCC 12-123, 27 FCC Rcd. 12,605 (Oct. 5, 2012).
464. Id. at para. 2.
465. See Promoting Innovation, supra note 186.
2016] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NET NEUTRALITY 627
power.466  Chairman Wheeler noted that, based on a “sizable cohort of
real life examples, not hypotheses,” the FCC’s more recent cable re-
port concluded that average cable rates are lower in deregulated mar-
kets.467  In another example of inconsistent reasoning, the FCC
concluded that “competition results in lower prices for consumers” in
the cable market,468 but not in the market for broadband Internet ac-
cess services.469
3. Mail Carriage
Congress and the courts have rejected the rationale of the virtuous
circle and gatekeeper theories in the context of mail carriage as well.
For example, in Greenburgh, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a congressional prohibition on the deposit of mailable ma-
terial in letter boxes without the payment of postage under the First
Amendment, because the practice deprived the postal service of con-
siderable revenue that it needed to maintain efficient service.470
Neither Congress nor the Court considered the ability of the postal
service’s end users to receive additional, unstamped material to be
beneficial to the delivery of the mail to all Americans.  To the contrary,
the Court thought it particularly ironic that the challenged regula-
tion’s role in supporting the overall success of the postal service was a
causal factor in the First Amendment challenge:
For it is because of the very fact that virtually every householder wishes to
have a mailing address and a receptacle in which mail sent to that address
will be deposited by the Postal Service that the letterbox or other mail recep-
tacle is attractive to those who wish to convey messages within a locality but
do not wish to purchase the stamp or pay such other fee as would permit them
to be transmitted by the Postal Service.471
It is implicit in the findings of Congress and the Court that granting
end users a right to access mailboxes for free would harm the ability of
the postal service to deliver the mail, and in turn, would ultimately
harm end users.
This rationale is directly analogous to the FCC’s findings with re-
spect to broadband before its adoption of the First Internet Order—
that the broadband Internet’s success was premised on the ability of
466. See Amendment to the Comm’ns Rules Concerning Effective Competition; Imple-
mentation of Section 111 of the STELA Reauthorization Act, Report and Order,
MB Docket No. 15-53, FCC 15-62, 2015 WL 3533156, para. 1 (June 3, 2015).
467. See id. at para. 20.
468. See id. at para. 21.
469. See First Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 40.
470. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 125 (1981)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 73-742, 2d Sess. 1 (1934)) (finding the practice of depositing
materials in mailboxes without paying postage “depriv[ed] the Post Office De-
partment of considerable revenue on matter which would otherwise go through
the mail”).
471. Id. at 123–24.
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ISPs to exercise control over their networks and that common carriage
regulation would inhibit new investments in Internet infrastruc-
ture.472 Greenburgh indicates that the FCC’s new decision to prohibit
ISPs from managing their networks for “business” reasons is
equivalent to killing the golden goose.  ISPs have no less interest in
preserving the value of their Internet investments than the postal ser-
vice has in preserving the service it controls, and there is no reason to
believe that the government-mandated right of free access to ISP net-
works granted to content providers by the FCC is any less harmful to
the Internet than permitting the deposit of letters without postage
was to the postal service.  Whether it is a hen (the postal service) or a
goose (the Internet), a farmer is deprived of the opportunity to gather
eggs when the golden fowl is smothered with good intentions.
The FCC’s conclusion that paid prioritization is inherently harmful
is also inconsistent with the government’s traditional approach to
mail carriage.  The postal service has a long tradition of prioritizing
and charging different rates for the delivery of different types of con-
tent without regard to differences in the cost of their delivery.  Con-
tent-based discrimination in the carriage of the mail was official
congressional policy for nearly a hundred years:
Congress, which legislated postage rates until 1970, encouraged the exchange
of newspapers and magazines by allowing them to travel through the mail at
extremely low rates of postage—in some cases for free.  Congress subsidized
postage on periodicals by over-charging for letter postage and, when neces-
sary, digging deep into the U.S. Treasury.473
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he second-class [mail]
privilege is a form of subsidy,” and that “[f]rom the beginning Con-
gress has allowed special rates to certain classes of publications.”474
Rather than declare such practices inherently harmful, however, the
Supreme Court has upheld the government’s right to engage in paid
prioritization of the mail for the purpose of subsidizing particular
forms of speech.475
Though the Supreme Court has changed course since Jackson with
respect to the right of the Postal Service to engage in express view-
point-based discrimination, the change was based on statutory inter-
pretation and the Court’s reappraisal of unique factual circumstances
that in no way diminish the First Amendment rights of private carri-
472. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 130, at paras. 41–46.
473. U.S. Postal Serv., Postage Rates for Periodicals: A Narrative History, ABOUT U.S.
POSTAL SERV. (June 2010), https://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-history/peri
odicals-postage-history.htm, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/U7BH-DZ94; see
generally, Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional
Law: How Early Post Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 671 (2007) (describing the history of franking privileges (free mail
delivery) and subsidized newspaper delivery in the United States).
474. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 151 (1946).
475. See id.
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ers.476  The Court permitted the Postal Service to discriminate
against particular views in Jackson and its progeny based on its hold-
ing that the government could not prohibit the transportation of such
views by private delivery services.  By the 1940s, however, it had be-
come apparent that the combination of the government-enforced pos-
tal monopoly and government-subsidized delivery of newspapers had
produced an artificial scarcity of private alternatives for the delivery
of periodicals.477  The government had not expressly run afoul of Jack-
son’s prohibition on government attempts to foreclose the private
transportation of non-mailable materials, but the subsidized delivery
of newspapers through the monopoly postal service had rendered the
postal service the only economical means of delivering them as a prac-
tical matter.478  “To refuse the second-class [subsidized] rate to a
newspapers [was] to make its circulation impossible . . . .”479
In the abstract, paying less for the delivery of newspapers and
other periodicals probably seemed like a good deal to most consumers,
but newspaper publishers and particularly voracious readers were the
primary beneficiaries.  Robert Heinlein’s admonition that “there ain’t
no such thing as a free lunch” proved just as applicable to the postal
service as at the local diner.480  While Congress ran the post office
with the intent to increase federal revenue (from its founding until the
mid-nineteenth century) it was usually profitable, but once Congress
shifted its priority toward subsidizing periodicals, the post office be-
came a perennial drain on the Treasury.481  After “the emergence of
this activist welfare orientation,” the Postal Service recorded a profit
only eight times in the 130 years from 1850 to 1980.482  Whether or
not they realized it, the people ultimately paid the price for this gov-
476. See id. at 155–56.  Justice Frankfurther’s concurring opinion indicates the First
Amendment was not necessary to the Court’s disposition of the case.  Id. at 159
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
477. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407, 430 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“But to carry newspapers gener-
ally at a sixth of the cost of the service, and to deny that service to one paper of
the same general character, because to the Postmaster General views therein ex-
pressed in the past seem illegal, would prove an effective censorship and abridge
seriously freedom of expression.”).
478. See Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 155–56; see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S.,
381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (“ ‘The United States may give up the [monopoly] post-
office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as
much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues . . . .’ ” (quoting
Burleson, 255 U.S. at 437 (Holmes, J., dissenting))); Desai, supra note 473, at
695–96 (noting the government’s legal monopoly over the mail “was strengthened
as a monopoly in practice by a whole host of other factors”).
479. Burleson, 255 U.S. at 437 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
480. See ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 162 (1st Tor ed. 1966).
481. See DE SOLA POOL, supra note 189, at 77.
482. See id.
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ernment policy through higher postal rates for first-class mail and
taxes.483
D. Issue Preclusion Does Not Apply
Citing the court’s acceptance of the virtuous circle theory in Ver-
izon v. FCC is insufficient to meet the standard for intermediate scru-
tiny.484  First, the net neutrality rules reviewed by the Verizon Court
were substantially less burdensome than the common carrier regula-
tions adopted in the Second Internet Order.  The previous rules did not
impose a bright-line ban on paid prioritization, apply strict non-dis-
crimination obligations to mobile providers, or include a vague prohi-
bition on other conduct that might result in a disadvantage.  Second,
the Verizon Court reviewed the FCC’s previous open Internet rules
using the statutory standard prescribed by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, which is “highly deferential” to congressionally delegated
authority,485 not the heightened degree of scrutiny required by the
First Amendment.486
E. There Is No Factual Finding of Scarcity
Red Lion and Turner—the leading cases in which the Supreme
Court has upheld restrictions on the freedom of the press under a less-
than-strict standard of scrutiny—are readily distinguishable from the
Second Internet Order.487  Neither case involved a presumptively in-
valid total ban on the editorial discretion of the press, and the limited
government restrictions in these cases were justified by detailed fac-
tual findings of scarcity.488
483. See Desai, supra note 473, at 694.
484. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 554.
485. See Nat’l Tel. Coop. Ass’n v. FCC, 563 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
486. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1041 (D.C. Cir.) (stating
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment “is more demanding that the
arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA”); see also Syracuse Peace Council
v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 658–59 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting the FCC receives broad
deference on issues of fact and policy, but not with respect to First Amendment
questions).
487. Other cases upholding restrictions on the freedom of the press have typically in-
volved some form of express agreement. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (noting that cable operators typi-
cally agree to provide programming access to municipalities during the local
franchising process).
488. Those who argue that “scarcity is no longer relevant in the age of broadband In-
ternet” do not explain how their theory would address the problem of censorship
by proxy discussed in Part III, infra. See Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini,
“Justice, and Only Justice, You Shall Pursue”: Network Neutrality, the First
Amendment and John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 137, 173 (2007).
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In Red Lion, the Court relied on the intrinsic scarcity of available
broadcast frequencies to justify the constitutionality of a regulation
requiring broadcasters to give “fair coverage” to public debates.489
The Court has since affirmed that the “justification for [its] distinct
approach to broadcast regulation rests upon the unique physical limi-
tations of the broadcast medium,” a rationale that “does not readily
translate into a justification for regulation of other means of commu-
nication.”490  The Court has also clarified that its limited holding in
Red Lion did not create a right of access that trumps the editorial dis-
cretion of broadcasters.  The Court instead held that “broad rights of
access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to
the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to
fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.”491
The Supreme Court’s decision to uphold limited rights of access to
cable systems was also based on a finding of scarcity.492  Congress ex-
tended must-carry rights only to local, over-the-air broadcasters who
are permitted to access only up to two-thirds of a cable operator’s total
channel capacity.493  In Turner II, a plurality of the Court held that
Congress had justified these limited access rights based on “substan-
tial evidence” that cable operators possessed monopoly market power
sufficient to cause “significant financial hardship” to broadcasters.494
Only one Justice believed the government could justify even the lim-
ited restriction on editorial discretion imposed by the must-carry rules
without a finding of monopoly market power,495 whereas four Justices
would have held that the facts regarding cable market power were in-
sufficient to demonstrate that the must-carry rules were narrowly tai-
lored.496  The Turner decisions indicate that, in the absence of a
finding of significant market power, even limited intrusions on the ed-
itorial discretion of the press are unconstitutional.
There are significant distinctions between the open Internet rules
and the regulations at issue in Red Lion and Turner II.  First, the total
ban on ISPs’ exercise of editorial discretion in the Second Internet Or-
489. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
490. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983)).
491. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998); see
also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 112–14
(1973) (“The basic principle underlying that responsibility is ‘the right of the pub-
lic to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the Government, any
broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own
particular views on any matter . . . .’ ” (quoting Report on Editorializing by Broad.
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949))).
492. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 197 (1997).
493. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 630–32 (1994).
494. See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 211.
495. See id. at 225 (Breyer, J., concurring).
496. See id. at 229 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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der is not limited in scope like the “fairness doctrine” in Red Lion or
the must-carry rules in Turner II.  The total ban benefits all content
providers, even those that possess significant market power them-
selves, and restricts all ISPs, even those who have no appreciable
market power or lack the capacity to transmit more than one video
stream at a time.  Second, the Second Internet Order lacks substantial
evidence that ISPs have sufficient market power to harm edge provid-
ers or consumers.  The FCC erroneously relied on the D.C. Circuit
Court’s opinion in Verizon v. FCC to conclude that the open Internet
rules were justified without finding that ISPs have market power.497
As noted above, however, the D.C. Circuit addressed only the FCC’s
statutory authority, not the First Amendment, and the previous rules
did not impose a total ban on editorial discretion.  Congress is free to
authorize FCC regulation in the absence of scarcity, but that does not
mean the delegation is constitutional.  Congress has no more author-
ity to abridge the freedom of the press than the FCC, and Supreme
Court precedent that requires a detailed factual showing of scarcity to
justify restrictions on the editorial discretion of the press binds Con-
gress and the FCC alike.498
497. See Second Internet Order, supra note 4, at para. 11 n.12.
498. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666–67.
